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Over the past decade, numerous issues largely ignored during the era of Sino-
American strategic cooperation emerged to complicate U.S.-China relations.  Key among 
these has been human rights, which both countries view differently.  Whereas the United 
States emphasizes individual civil and political liberties, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) primarily advocates economic, social, and cultural rights.  This has provided a 
major source of conflict as Washington has attempted to compel Beijing to provide civil 
and political liberties to the Chinese people, which Beijing has long withheld in order to 
preserve power.  These differences, combined with a lack of consensus in Washington 
regarding China policy, the influence of competing interests groups, and the dilemma 
policymakers face between protecting national interests and upholding American values, 
makes human rights difficult to address.   
This thesis offers recommendations regarding a more effective approach to human 
rights improvements in China.  The United States should emphasize China’s obligation, 
as a responsible member of the international community, to comply with international 
human rights standards.  Most importantly, Washington must maintain a strong and 
consistent stance on the issue.  This is particularly true given Beijing’s recent attempts to 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Over the past decade, largely as a consequence of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Sino-American relations 
have been inconsistent and unstable, as both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
the United States (U.S.) attempted to develop a new foundation for a cooperative 
relationship.  The United States emerged from the Cold War as the only remaining 
superpower, and it continues to surpass the PRC in its political influence, economic 
strength, and military capability.  However, the PRC is a large and powerful country in its 
own right.  Already considered a regional power, it has the potential to become a 
dominant force on the international stage as well.  Since 1978, the PRC has sustained 
remarkable economic growth, and today its GDP stands at more than $1.1 trillion.1  Over 
the past decade, after witnessing the astounding performance of the United States’ 
military during the Gulf War in 1991, the PRC initiated a large-scale military 
modernization program.  The PRC’s perceived military buildup, combined with its 
increasing political and economic influence, has caused some concern in the United 
States that a rising China, particularly one controlled by a communist government, could 
challenge American interests in Asia as well as in other parts of the world.  Debate 
ensued about whether the United States would be better served by pursing a policy of 
“engagement” or a policy of “containment” toward the PRC.  Individuals who perceived 
a rising China to be a threat to American interests advocated the former, while 
individuals who believed a strong China could facilitate American interests advocated the 
latter.   
Within China a similar debate exists.  Following the end of the Cold War, the 
Chinese found themselves confronted with a new world order, where they could not 
simply balance the power of the stronger superpower by aligning themselves with the 
weaker.  As the international community transformed itself into a unipolar system and the 
basis for the Sino-American relationship changed, so did the PRC’s approach to 
conducting relations with the United States.  Within its broader goals of economic 
                                                 
1“China's GDP to Top 10 Trillion Yuan in 2002,” Internet. Available from: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200212/08/eng20021208_108119.shtml; accessed 13 December 2002. 
2 
development, ensuring regional and global stability, and protecting national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, the PRC views the United States both as a potential ally and as a 
possible adversary.  Ambiguous and sometimes conflicting statements from Washington 
as to whether the United States views Beijing as a “strategic partner” or “strategic 
competitor” perpetuate this view.  The Chinese approach to Sino-American relations is 
complex, but in general, Beijing collaborates with Washington when it suits its interests, 
while promoting multipolarity through the United Nations (UN), the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other multilateral organizations.  China seeks to 
maximize access to American markets and investment capital and benefit from the 
stabilizing effects of the United States’ military presence and policies in Asia.  At the 
same time, China seeks to minimize the United States’ influence in the region and to 
dilute its ability to dominate China in the international arena.   
In spite of their mutual feelings of distrust and insecurity, over the past decade 
Washington and Beijing attempted to maintain productive relations by focusing on 
common interests, such as stability on the Korean Peninsula and expanded economic 
relations, and downplaying their considerable differences.  However, lacking the 
overarching threat of Soviet aggression, a number of conflicting issues largely ignored 
during the era of Sino-American strategic cooperation emerged to complicate their 
relationship, including the issue of human rights.  This thesis addresses why human rights 
are such a controversial topic in Sino-American relations and why it is a difficult issue 
for policymakers to address.  It then offers recommendations regarding a more effective 
policy approach to human rights improvements in China.  Through a case study of recent 
events and policies affecting the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), this 
thesis also assesses the impact of the on-going American “war on terrorism” on the issue 
of human rights in Sino-American relations.  
Human rights have long been a controversial topic in Sino-American relations.  
As explained in Chapter II, the United States and the PRC differ fundamentally in the 
way they define human rights.  As a democracy and duly influenced by classical Western 
philosophers such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant, the United States defines human 
rights primarily in terms of individual civil and political liberties.  In contrast, as a 
socialist country, the PRC defines human rights predominantly in terms of economic, 
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social, and cultural rights.  Furthermore, despite its rhetoric, the ruling Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), as an authoritarian regime, has long withheld certain civil and 
political freedoms in order to preserve its power over the Chinese people.  Domestically 
and internationally, Beijing has consistently used human rights as a means to further its 
interests, namely to perpetuate the rule of the CCP, preserve the socialist state, and 
maintain territorial integrity and national sovereignty.   
The legacy of Wilsonian idealism, combined with frequent pressure from the U.S. 
Congress, the American public, and various interest groups, have caused most recent 
American presidents to promote human rights in U.S. foreign policy.  In his inaugural 
address, former President George Bush stated, “America is never wholly herself unless 
she is engaged in high moral principle.  We as a people have such a purpose today.  It is 
to make kinder the face of the Nation and gentler the face of the world.”2  Particularly 
since the widely publicized suppression of the democracy movement in 1989, Americans 
have been concerned with the progression of human rights in China.  Comparing the 
rights guaranteed in China with the standards set by the international community reveals 
that the human rights conditions in China fall short of international standards, and 
Chapter II lists the most egregious of violations typically cited against the Chinese 
government.  Over the past decade, Washington made various attempts to compel Beijing 
to improve its human rights policies.  Not surprisingly, Beijing resented Washington’s 
efforts to dictate or otherwise influence its domestic policies.  The PRC views human 
rights as an internal matter and the U.S. agitation on behalf of human rights as a violation 
of national sovereignty and international law.3  Responding to international criticism of 
the human rights conditions in China, Beijing also points to differences in cultural 
standards, claiming that the rights provided in the PRC are just as important as those 
provided for in other countries.4  Finally, the PRC claims that its human rights record is 
at least as good as that of its critics.5   
                                                 
2 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search For 
Security, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 186. 
3 “Opposed to Any Hegemonic Activities on the Pretext of Human Rights,” China Society for Human 
Rights Studies, Internet.  Available from http://humanrights-china.org/international/20011017160747.htm; 
accessed 19 April 2002. 
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Chapter III explores the domestic issues that further complicate the subject of 
human rights in Sino-American relations.  These include the lack of consensus in 
Washington regarding China policy, the influence of competing interests groups in the 
policy making process, and finally, the dilemma the issue of human rights creates 
between protecting national interests and upholding American values.  When addressing 
the issue of human rights in the PRC, policymakers must choose between economic and 
security interests, which often appear to be best served by maintaining a productive 
relationship with China, and upholding basic American values, by condemning Beijing’s 
flagrant human rights abuses.  Addressing the issue of human rights as part of a multi-
faceted engagement policy, rather than as the defining issue in Sino-American relations, 
allows for more a productive relationship with Beijing.  However, examining the U.S. 
approach to the issue of human rights in Sino-American relations since 1989 reveals that 
Washington is more successful when it takes a firm and consistent stance on the issue.   
After Tiananmen, former President George Bush simultaneously pressured 
Beijing on human rights issues while reassuring Chinese leaders about the United States’ 
desire to maintain a constructive relationship.  As a result, Beijing made a number of 
concessions on human rights and other issues.  However, following former President 
Clinton’s 1994 decision to “delink” China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status 
from its human rights record, Beijing has been less convinced of the American 
commitment to human rights.  Consequently, it has been less receptive to Washington’s 
demands, perpetuating the view that it will not negotiate over human rights.  Although 
still the subject of much debate within the United States, the issue of human rights largely 
receded into the background of China policy as first Clinton and then current President 
George W. Bush concentrated on addressing other issues.  However, the on-going 
American war on terrorism has significant implications for the PRC’s western-most 
province, the XUAR, and again elevated the issue of human rights to the forefront of 
Sino-American relations.  
                                                 
4 “On the Universality and Particularity of Human Rights,” China Society for Human Rights Studies,  
Internet. Available from http://www.humanrights-china.org/course/Basic2001101095515; accessed 19 
April, 2002. 
5 Nathan and Ross, p. 189. 
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 Following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
and the American declaration of war on international terrorism, Beijing jumped at the 
opportunity to lobby the international community for support with its own decades-long 
“terrorist” problem: the continuing social unrest and violence in the XUAR.  Through a 
case study of the XUAR, Chapter IV addresses the impact of the war on terrorism on 
human rights in Sino-American relations.  Beijing’s latest efforts to establish support for 
its crackdown on Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang presented Washington with an all too 
familiar dilemma: uphold the importance of human rights or subordinate them to other, 
more pressing national interests.  Specifically, the question is: should the United States 
condone Beijing’s crackdown on the XUAR’s Uyghur ethnic minority, which has 
resulted in some of the worst human rights violations in the country, in order to gain 
Beijing’s support for its war on terrorism?  For over a year, Washington refused to 
acknowledge the Uyghurs as terrorists.  However, it became increasingly difficult to deny 
some Uyghur extremists’ links to Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist network, particularly after 
U.S. forces encountered Uyghurs fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Even so, 
the challenge remained for Washington to acknowledge this connection without giving 
Beijing blanket approval for its harsh and often inappropriate policies in the region. 
In order for Washington to respond appropriately to Beijing, it is first necessary to 
understand the circumstances surrounding the violence and unrest in the XUAR.  Chapter 
IV identifies who the Uyghurs are and explains their major complaints against the 
Chinese government, which have spurred violence in the region over the past decade.  
The chapter also presents the view from Beijing, explaining why the XUAR is important 
to PRC leaders and how they perceive the Uyghur threat.  Next, the chapter outlines how 
Beijing has chosen to deal with the perceived Uyghur threat both domestically and 
internationally, and the consequences of Beijing’s XUAR policies.  It evaluates how 
Beijing could develop a more successful policy toward the XUAR while simultaneously 
improving the region’s human rights conditions and the PRC’s reputation in the 
international arena.  The chapter concludes by making recommendations for how the 
United States should respond to Beijing’s overtures regarding the Uyghurs. 
The Tiananmen Square massacre and the demise of the Soviet Union marked a 
major turning point in Sino-American relations.  Without a strategic rationale for the 
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relationship, American policy toward China became hostage to the lack of consensus in 
Washington and the increasing influence of interest groups in the policy making process.  
Concerted efforts of engagement by former President Bush allowed for the continuation 
of cooperation between American and Chinese leaders as well as the achievement of 
important American interests, however, the relationship lacked a clear vision for the post-
Cold War era.  Under the Clinton administration, an ill-defined, crisis driven approach to 
managing Sino-American relations resulted in further policy drift.  Prior to the September 
11 terrorist attacks, the current Bush administration seemed to be taking a similar 
approach.  Chapter V addresses the need for a guiding doctrine that is appropriate to the 
challenges facing U.S.-China relations today.  Without such a doctrine, it is difficult to 
maintain a stable, productive relationship with Beijing or successfully address an issue as 
complicated as human rights.  The chapter also makes recommendations concerning how 
the United States could achieve greater success in its efforts to improve the human rights 


























II. AREAS OF DISSENTION 
A. DEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS 
The concept of human rights originated in the Age of Enlightenment, when 
scholars and political figures alike argued that certain freedoms and rights were 
fundamental to the human existence.  These rights were viewed as universal and 
unalienable, and no government had the authority to violate or in any way minimize 
them.  To protect these rights, some countries incorporated them in legal and binding 
documents such as the American and French constitutions.  Although the concept of 
human rights dates back to the eighteenth century, only in the aftermath of World War II 
have human rights received widespread attention throughout the international arena.  As 
such, the international human rights movement is a twentieth century phenomenon.  Over 
the past five decades, the international community, as individual states or through 
intergovernmental institutions such as the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), 
has exerted increasing pressure on nations to guarantee basic rights within their borders.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also important actors within the 
international human rights movement.   
Since the 1960s, human rights NGOs have helped to legitimize international 
concern for human rights and to incorporate concern for human rights into the foreign 
policies of individual countries.6  Their primary role is to track human rights abuses 
around the world and pressure nations to improve their human rights conditions.  Two of 
the most prominent and well-respected human rights NGOs are Amnesty International 
(AI), established in 1961, and Human Rights Watch (HRW), established in 1978.7  They 
are viewed as highly credible, impartial organizations, and both devote considerable 
attention to the human rights conditions in the PRC.  The information AI, HRW, and 
other NGOs obtain is particularly useful to the UNCHR as it attempts to evaluate 
allegations against the human rights records of the PRC and other states in order to 
                                                 
6 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p. 14.  
7 Kerry Dumbaugh, “Interest Groups: Growing Influence,” Ramon H. Myers, Michel C. Oksenberg, 
and David Shambaugh, eds., Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), p. 126-27. 
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enforce the standards agreed upon by the international community.  Enforcement of 
international human rights standards is the biggest obstacle facing the international 
human rights regime today.   
In spite of the increasing prominence given to the international human rights 
movement, the ability of the international human rights regime to enforce UN standards 
upon individual states is limited, primarily because states remain the primary actors 
within the international system as well as the primary wielders of power.  States jealously 
guard their sovereignty, which limits the amount of power they are willing to delegate to 
international bodies, including human rights organizations.  Even so, increased 
international scrutiny has motivated many nations, including the PRC, to at least improve 
the perceptions of their internal human rights conditions, as well as to play a more active 
role in the international human rights movement.  However, in spite of China’s increased 
participation in the international human rights regime, PRC domestic human rights 
conditions still fail to meet many international standards.  
1. International Standards 
On December 10, 1948, the UN proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), affirming “their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women” and promoting 
“social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”8  In addition to the 
UDHR, the two most authoritative internationally recognized human rights documents 
are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which were 
established on December 16, 1966.  These two documents further define the rights and 
standards espoused by the international community, and unlike the UDHR, are treaties 
with binding legal requirements once signed and ratified by a state.  The ICCPR and 
ICESCR elucidate the two broad categories of rights recognized within the international 
community.  The first category contains civil and political rights, sometimes called 
negative rights, while the second category refers to economic, social, and cultural rights, 
known as positive rights.  Negative rights are often interpreted to mean the individual’s 
                                                 
8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Internet.  Available from 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/udhr.html; accessed 5 February 2002. 
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“freedom from” undue interference or repression by their governing authority.9  Positive 
rights typically imply granting the individual access to scarce resources, or “freedom to” 
pursue goals, usually within the economic realm.10  
Taken together, the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR are widely recognized 
as the International Bill of Human Rights, outlining the minimum social and political 
guarantees necessary for a life of dignity.11  Both the UDHR and the ICCPR relate to 
civil and political rights, and declare that human beings have basic rights to life, liberty, 
security of person, and equality before the law.12  They also outlaw slavery, torture, and 
arbitrary arrest, and uphold the right of freedom of movement and to choose one’s 
residence.13  They state that the individual shall enjoy freedom of conscience and 
religion, the right to hold opinions without interference, and the right to freedom of 
expression, subject to legal restriction needed to protect the rights or reputations of 
others, national security, or public health or morals.14  Finally, they prohibit arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence.15  Similar to the 
UDHR and the ICCPR, the ICESCR lays out specific liberties relating to economic and 
cultural rights.  For example, the ICESCR guarantees the right to work, enjoy safe 
working conditions, receive fair wages and social security, and form trade unions.16  The 
UDHR and the ICESCR both uphold the right to education and property rights.   
Although the international community considers both positive and negative rights 
important and worthy of protection under the law, the extent to which individual 
countries guarantee these rights varies.  Nations that champion negative rights place a 
great deal of emphasis on principles of justice that permit individual responsibility and 
                                                 
9 Richard W. Wilson, “Rights in the People’s Republic of China,” James C. Hsiung, ed., Human 
Rights in East Asia: A Cultural Perspective,” (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1985), p.116. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Donnelly, p. 10. 
12 R. Randle Edwards, “Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today,” R. 
Randle Edwards, ed., Human Rights in Contemporary China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), p. 53. 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, p. 53. 
16 “International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” 16 Dec 1966, Internet. 
Available from: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm; accessed 25 February 2002. 
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that oppose encroachment or unwarranted restrictions on what a person wishes to do.17  
In contrast, nations that emphasize positive rights generally emphasize the needs of the 
community over those of the individual, and support principles of justice that encourage 
people to achieve their fair share of the rewards of society.18  Although it is possible for 
governments to uphold both positive and negative rights, modern societies tend to 
emphasize either one or the other.  Typically, liberal democracies emphasize the former 
and socialist states emphasize the latter, and the United States and the PRC are not 
exceptions.  Their differing opinions about how to define human rights are the primary 
reasons for contention between the two nations regarding human rights.  
2. The American Perspective 
As a democracy and duly influenced by classical Western philosophers such as 
John Locke and Immanuel Kant, the United States defines human rights primarily in 
terms of protecting the individual’s civil and political freedoms from excessive 
interference by the state.  Although the United States primarily emphasizes the 
importance of civil and political liberties, such as freedoms of speech, assembly, and 
religion, it is important to note that it also values social and economic rights.  Comparing 
the United States’ human rights record with international standards reveals that even 
though the United States does not guarantee most social and economic rights in its laws 
or Constitution, the majority of American citizens claim these rights.  However, the 
United States is not without its critics.  AI publishes annual reports on countries’ human 
rights violations, and in its 2002 report on the United States AI cited the extensive use of 
the death penalty (66 individuals were executed between January and December 2001), 
reported on police brutality and ill-treatment in prisons, and voiced concern for some 
aspects of “anti-terrorism” legislation passed since the September 11 attacks.19  The 
United States has also been criticized for having neither signed nor ratified the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR.   
                                                 
17 Wilson, p. 117. 
18 Ibid. 
19 “United States of America,” Amnesty International Report 2002, Internet.  Available on 
http://www.amnesty.org; accessed 22 July 2002. 
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Additionally, the PRC often criticizes the United States on human rights grounds, 
but this is primarily in response to the United States’ criticism of its own human rights 
record.  The report published by the PRC in March 2002, barely a week after the United 
States published its report on the PRC, asserted that “once again the United States, 
assuming the role of ‘world judge of human rights,’ has distorted human rights conditions 
in many countries and regions in the world, including China, and accused them of human 
rights violations, all the while turning a blind eye to its own human rights-related 
problems.”20  The report emphasized instances of violent crimes partly brought on by the 
prevalence of private gun ownership, the gap between high and low income families, 
racial and gender discrimination, and criticized the United States for “wantonly infringing 
upon the sovereignty of, and human rights in, other countries.”21  It is interesting to note 
that the report read more like a criticism of the state of American society than the 
government’s human rights policies.  The report was largely brushed aside in the United 
States, but was welcomed by the Chinese populace and other Asian nations.  The report 
effectively rallied Chinese nationalism and conveyed to the public the dangers of a 
Western, liberal society.    
3. The Chinese Perspective 
In contrast to the United States, as a socialist country, the PRC views human 
rights predominantly in terms of economic, social, and cultural rights.  In spite of its 
rhetoric, the ruling CCP, as an authoritarian regime, has long withheld certain civil and 
political liberties to preserve its power over the Chinese people.  Although some cultural 
relativists point to China’s historic emphasis on the good of the community versus the 
rights of the individual as the primary factor accounting for Beijing’s definition of human 
rights, this is a misrepresentation of PRC intentions.  Since the beginning of democratic 
reforms on Taiwan in 1987, Chinese democracy advocates have pointed to Taiwan’s 
progress as proof that neither a Leninist party structure nor a Chinese cultural heritage 
prohibits democratization in China.22  Taiwan’s reforms are also evidence that a Chinese 
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cultural heritage is not incompatible with “Western” definitions of human rights, as the 
Taiwanese people now enjoy many previously denied civil and political freedoms.  There 
are similarities between traditional Confucian values and socialist rights, however, the 
human rights conditions in China exist primarily because of the CCP’s authoritarian rule, 
and its use of ideology and government institutions to protect party interests.  Above all 
else, the PRC is a communist country controlled from the top down, and the 
government’s main priorities are to perpetuate the rule of the CCP, preserve the socialist 
state, and maintain territorial integrity and national sovereignty.  These priorities result in 
an overriding concern for both internal and external security, which influences all aspects 
of state-society relations in China.   
Beijing’s human rights policies are no exception, as the government cannot 
implement improvements in the human rights conditions in the PRC without first asking 
the question, “how will these changes affect the security of the regime?”  Therefore, the 
ruling CCP’s paramount interest in the continuation of its rule, the preservation of the 
socialist state, and maintaining territorial integrity is the primary motivating factor behind 
what the government will allow and what it will not.  The government’s failure to provide 
civil and political liberties, as well as the freedom to practice one’s religion, is directly 
related to its security concerns.  To detract from its failure to provide many civil and 
political freedoms, the PRC emphasizes the importance of economic and social rights, the 
right to development, and the importance of national sovereignty.  Furthermore, in an 
effort to legitimize and perpetuate its rule, CCP ideology continues to espouse principles 
that justify the regime’s “socialist democracy” and criticize any idea that even remotely 
challenges CCP authority as “Western” and therefore of little or no use in the PRC.       
According to CCP ideology, the purpose of the Chinese socialist system is to 
establish and maintain a socialist society.  As such, the focus of government is to provide 
for the welfare of the general public, and the individual is a beneficiary of the system, but 
not the foundation of society.23  In such a society, individualism is an obstacle to 
overcome, as man achieves true freedom only in community.24  By minimizing the rights 
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of the individual and focusing on the good of the community, Chinese socialist ideology 
resembles traditional Confucian values, which were also useful for maintaining control 
over the Chinese populace.  Chinese Confucian traditions emphasized stability, order, 
respect for authority, and a balance between the individual’s interests and those of 
society.25  The family, not the individual, was the basis of society, and filial piety had a 
great impact on Chinese society and political culture.26  Rulers were expected to be 
benevolent and wise, but even if they were not, subjects were expected to remain loyal.  
Confucian society was hierarchical, and governed by expectations for right conduct.  In a 
similar manner, the PRC constitution lays out the “rights and duties” and the conduct 
expected of its citizens.  Also similar to the current situation in the PRC, inequality in the 
distribution of wealth and power, limited political participation, and harsh punishments 
characterized traditional Chinese society.27  The ruling CCP capitalizes upon these 
similarities by emphasizing the importance of community and self-sacrifice, encouraging 
the people’s fear of social unrest, particularly since the chaos of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76), and perpetuating the belief that Western-style democracy 
and definitions of human rights are not appropriate for China.   
In addition to creating an ideology that justifies the regime’s “socialist 
democracy,” the authoritarian CCP employs governmental institutions, such as its 
constitution and the National People’s Congress, as other means to legitimize and 
perpetuate its rule.  The Chinese constitution does not claim to be a contract between the 
government and the people, setting forth conditions under which the people will be 
governed, rather, it is a manifesto, by the leaders to the people, describing the 
government that is promised.28  Regarding individual rights, the constitution does not 
prescribe inalienable rights guaranteed to the people nor does it set limits to which the 
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government must conform.  Instead, it sets forth rights that the government claims to be 
providing.29   
According to the 1982 PRC constitution, the Chinese people chose socialism and 
democratic centralism, and are therefore committed to upholding the Chinese socialist 
state.  Human rights in the PRC are intertwined with the duties required of a citizen of a 
socialist society.  The primary right that socialism provides is the right to live and work 
in a socialist society.30  Because of the link between rights and duties, rights may not 
infringe upon the socialist interests of the state or society.  Citizens of the PRC enjoy 
“socialist rights,” which means the exercise of any rights, such as freedom of speech, 
assembly, or association, may not occur to the detriment of socialism or the socialist 
Chinese state.31  In practice, this means that individuals are not free to express views that 
are contrary to socialism, overly critical of the CCP, or would in any way advocate a 
system other than socialism. 
In the PRC, the ruling elite holds that rights are a grant from the state and can 
therefore be subjected to conditions or abrogation if the state deems it necessary.32  
Furthermore, the Chinese state does not have an independent judiciary whose sole 
responsibility is to interpret and enforce the constitution.  The ruling CCP controls the 
legislatures, procurators, and judges, who write, amend, interpret, and enforce the 
constitution and other laws.33  The lack of checks and balances in the Chinese state 
enables the political leaders to use the constitution as an instrument for legitimacy.  This 
is in sharp contrast to the use of similar institutions in most Western nations as structures 
to promote the rule of law, protect basic human rights, provide checks and balances over 
the government, and provide against extensive governmental control over society.   
Comparing the rights guaranteed in China with the standards set by the 
international community reveals that the human rights conditions in China fall short of 
international standards.  The ruling CCP guarantees a wide range of economic and social 
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rights, but very limited civil and political rights, so that individuals are unable to 
challenge China’s socialist government.  CCP leaders are careful to protect individual 
freedoms only as far as they do not undermine the party’s authority or interfere with the 
policies of the state.  The 1983 constitution guarantees a number of rights, such as the 
“freedom of the person,” or protection against arbitrary arrest, detention, or illegal search, 
however, the constitution also states that the individual must not “infringe upon the 
interests of the state, of society, and of the collective.”34  Freedom of thought, speech, 
and assembly must also confirm to similar constraints, and freedom of movement is 
restricted within China.  Other human rights violations can be attributed to China’s weak 
legal system.  Although the constitution, code of criminal procedure, and other laws 
provide for procedural rights, such as independence of the judiciary, the right to public 
trial, a defense attorney, and appeal, they continue to be inconsistently applied.35  
The ruling CCP guarantees a wider range of economic and social rights, but in 
some areas they still fall short of international standards.  For example, on February 28, 
2001, the PRC ratified the ICESCR, however, the government placed a reservation on its 
obligations toward Article 8, which addressed the right to freedom of association and the 
right to form trade unions.36  Chinese workers are not free to form labor unions 
independent from the state trade union body, the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU).  The ACFTU is tightly controlled by the CCP and its primary purpose is to 
serve the interest of the state and the Party, not the country’s workers.  There are 
regulations in place concerning workplace health and safety, work hours, and over time 
pay, but these are not adequately enforced.37  Rising unemployment, partly due to the 
closure of state-owned enterprises, also contributes to worker unrest.  In the spring of 
2002 in Daqing, Liaoyang, and Fushan, the Chinese authorities forcibly repressed 
thousands of workers protesting the nonpayment of back wages and pensions, loss of 
benefits, insufficient severance pay, corrupt company and government officials, and their 
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inability to obtain redress for their grievances.38  In some cases, the leaders of these 
demonstrations were arrested and imprisoned.  Overall, the rights guaranteed in China are 
improving, but the CCP continues to deny fundamental civil and political freedoms that 
would allow individuals to criticize the socialist state. 
B. DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS 
In addition to their conflicting perspectives on defining human rights, the United 
States and the PRC have different approaches to defending human rights.  To the United 
States, defending human rights not only means ensuring the rights of its own citizens but 
also denotes a moral obligation to advocate the rights of individuals in other countries, 
especially when evidence demonstrates particularly harsh human rights conditions exist.  
This feeling of obligation, rooted in Wilsonian idealism and reinforced by pressure from 
the U.S. Congress, various interest groups, and the American public, typically results in a 
foreign policy that promotes American values, including Western notions of human 
rights.  This has been particularly true in the case of U.S. policy toward the PRC over the 
past decade.  Since the suppression of the 1989 democracy movement, the United States 
government has closely monitored the development of human rights and the rule of law 
in China.  Washington has frequently pressured Beijing concerning expanding civil and 
political freedoms and a number of other human rights related issues.   
Addressing human rights in its foreign policy was a not a new task for the PRC.  
Internationally, since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, rather than promote human 
rights in and of themselves, CCP leaders have employed human rights consistently in 
their foreign policy as a means to criticize their perceived enemies and further national 
interests, primarily to promote the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the 
Chinese state.  From the 1950s, when they were used to denounce the United States and 
strengthen friendships with revolutionary movements, to the 1960s, when they were used 
to criticize both the Soviet Union and the United States, to the 1970s, when China joined 
the UN and increased its participation in the international human rights regime, to the 
1980s, when China joined the UNHRC, human rights featured prominently in PRC 
foreign policy.39  Throughout these decades, the PRC often portrayed itself as a 
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champion of human rights, particularly for third world countries.  To do this, the PRC 
adopted the role of leader for developing countries, willing to challenge the Western 
definition of human rights by emphasizing economic and cultural rights and the right to 
self-determination.   
In the 1990s, following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, human rights 
continued to play an important role in Chinese foreign policy, as the ruling CCP 
attempted to regain its legitimacy and standing within the international human rights 
regime.  For the PRC, defending human rights typically involves arguing the validity of 
its more economic oriented definitions of human rights.  The PRC strongly resents U.S. 
pressures concerning its treatment of dissidents and other human rights issues.  Beijing 
views human rights as an internal matter and regards Washington’s desire to dictate to or 
otherwise influence its policies as a violation of national sovereignty and international 
law.  Unlike the United States, the PRC evaluates “good governance” on the ability to 
provide social stability and economic growth, and does not understand the American 
obsession with civil and political liberties.  Beijing considers Washington’s efforts as an 
attempt to export American values and would rather leave such matters out of its bilateral 
foreign policy discussions.  Beijing is “firmly opposed to any country making use of 
human rights to sell its own values, ideology, political standards and mode of 
development, and to any country interfering in the internal affairs of other countries on 
the pretext of human rights.”40  Chinese leaders resent that China is frequently the target 
of international condemnation regarding its human rights policies.  They assert that 
compared with the policies of the past, human rights in China have improved 
significantly.   
Under Mao Zedong, very little individual freedom existed within China and 
oppression and persecution were rampant.  Due to Mao’s incessant calls for revolution 
and his tumultuous economic policies the country suffered other human rights 
catastrophes, such as long periods of social disorder and famine.  In spite of these 
circumstances, the international community largely ignored the human rights conditions 
in China during the first three decades of CCP rule.  After Mao’s death a more pragmatic 
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leadership took control, led by Deng Xiaoping, and human rights conditions in China 
relatively improved.  Under Deng’s leadership, the CCP no longer employed the 
revolutionary mass mobilization techniques common to the Mao era, and the 
implementation of economic reforms raised the standard of living for many Chinese.  
Furthermore, since 1978, Beijing has worked to establish a comprehensive and formal 
legal system, including changes in China’s legislative structure, the training of thousands 
of defense lawyers, and the launching of a major public legal-education movement, 
resulting in a greater awareness by the average Chinese citizen of his rights and remedies 
under the law.41   
Deng’s economic opening made Chinese society considerably more tolerant of 
Western political ideas, which led many Westerners to optimistically believe the PRC 
was on the verge of adopting a more liberal and democratic system of government.  
International human rights activists thought otherwise, however, focusing on the PRC’s 
continued lack of civil and political freedoms.  The CCP’s ruthless military suppression 
of the democracy protests held in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 conclusively proved 
the more pessimistic observers were correct.  Although Deng advocated “political 
reform,” what he meant was a renewed effort to reduce inefficiency and corruption, not 
democracy and liberalization.42  Deng was committed to economic reforms, which he 
saw as necessary to make China a rich and powerful country.  However, he was equally 
committed to preserving the absolute authority of the CCP.  Along with many other 
leaders, Deng wanted structural and administrative reform, not reform of China’s 
socialist system.  Therefore, Deng was not particularly open to calls for democracy, 
liberalization, and higher human rights standards that challenged the CCP’s authority, 
and repeatedly cracked down on dissidents and human rights activists.   
In spite of its tragic ending, the Tiananmen Square massacre was successful in 
that it finally focused the international community’s attention on the human rights 
conditions of China.  This incident incited international condemnation and led to 
numerous economic and political reprisals, and the PRC suffered a tremendous set back 
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in international standing regarding human rights.  Since the Tiananmen Square massacre, 
the CCP ruling elite, led by Jiang Zemin, has striven to regain its legitimacy within the 
eyes of the Chinese people and the international community by demonstrating that the 
PRC is a country that respects human life and promotes human rights.  However, the 
CCP continues to dictate domestic policy according to its interests, namely to preserve 
power and the socialist state, protect territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and 
promote economic development, from which it increasingly derives its legitimacy.   
Throughout the last decade, CCP leaders’ main priorities have been to preserve 
the party’s power and maintain social stability, and the methods they employ result in 
considerable human rights violations.  Excessive use of the death penalty, pervasive 
torture and ill treatment of prisoners and detainees, the prevalence of summary trials and 
the lack of due process in court proceedings, widespread religious repression, persecution 
of political dissidents, human rights activists, and labor reformers, “cultural genocide” 
and persecution of minorities, and the lack of a free press and access to the Internet are 
some of the violations documented by the U.S. Department of State, AI, HRW, and other 
human rights NGOs.43  Although the PRC typically denies the extent of its human rights 
violations, much evidence exists to the contrary.  AI estimates that there are at least 6,000 
political prisoners being held in China, including advocates of democracy, labor activists, 
Catholic priests, Falun Gong practitioners and Buddhist monks.44  
In response to international criticism of its lack of civil and political freedoms, the 
PRC argues that foreigners, particularly Americans, use human rights as an excuse to 
interfere in Chinese domestic affairs, hoping to promote chaos and discredit the ruling 
CCP.45  The PRC also accuses the United States of inconsistency, ignoring more severe 
human rights violations in other countries but obsessing about the conditions in China.  In 
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1994, Chinese finance minister Liu Zhongli stated, “The United States maintains a triple 
standard.  For their own human rights problems they shut their eyes.  For some other 
countries’ human rights questions they open one eye and shut the other.  And for China, 
they open both eyes and stare.”46  Chinese leaders deny the existence of political 
prisoners or prisoners of conscience, asserting that all individuals imprisoned in China 
are guilty of violating Chinese laws.  The PRC also points to differences in cultural 
standards, claiming that the rights provided in the PRC are just as important as those 
provided for in other countries.  Economic, social, and cultural rights are important, 
however, providing them does not negate the need to provide civil and political rights as 
well.  Chinese dissidents, who are seeking the negative rights denied to them, will 
continue to come into conflict with the ruling CCP.  Finally, the PRC claims that its 
human rights record is at least as good as its critics.  Based on the information available 
about the numerous human rights violations that occur in the PRC, this is a questionable 
claim, but one that serves to rally nationalism and support from within China.   
The 1999 humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and the ongoing American war on 
terrorism gave added significance to the issue of human rights in PRC foreign policy.  
The United States led NATO intervention in Kosovo caused much concern among PRC 
leaders and scholars that the international community, particularly the United States, 
might one day find reason to intervene in its domestic affairs, specifically regarding its 
policies in Xinjiang, Tibet, or its claim on Taiwan.47  Beijing is aware of international 
NGOs’ increasing interest regarding its policies in the XUAR.  Similar attention preceded 
the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999.  In response, the PRC continued to 
emphasize the importance of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, while pursuing 
closer relationships with nations with similar concerns.  The PRC also increased its 
participation in international human rights organizations and discourse, always striving to 
improve the perceptions of its human rights policies.  Finally, in an attempt to legitimize 
its increasing restrictions and down play the numerous human rights violations occurring 
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in the XUAR, Beijing requested international support of its crackdown on Uyghur 
separatists in the name of combating global terrorism.  
Defining human rights is a difficult and complicated task, and although the 
international community has reached a consensus in the form of the UDHR, the ICCPR, 
and the ICESCR, individual countries still have differing viewpoints, as exemplified by 
the American and Chinese cases.  Largely because it is a Western, liberal democracy, the 
United States focuses on the importance of the individual’s right to exercise civil and 
political freedoms, whereas the PRC espouses “socialist rights,” which emphasize 
economic, social, and cultural rights and the good of the community.  Rights such as 
freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, and association may not be exercised to criticize 
socialism or threaten the authority of the ruling CCP.  Furthermore, because of the 
authoritarian nature of the CCP regime, Chinese governmental institutions, such as the 
1982 PRC constitution and the National People’s Congress, do not exist to promote the 
rule of law, protect basic human rights, provide checks and balances over the 
government, and provide against extensive governmental control over society.  Rather, 
they are another instrument of CCP legitimacy and control.  Washington’s attempts to 
influence PRC policies and Beijing’s subsequent resentment against such efforts further 
complicate human rights in Sino-American relations.  However, in spite of Beijing’s 
resistance to Washington’s policies, most Chinese leaders recognize that human rights 
have become an integral component of Sino-American relations.  Given the influence of 
American values and democratic ideals, various human rights NGOs, interest groups, and 
the U.S. Congress on China policy, as long as the PRC continues to deny its citizens civil 




































III.  HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. CHINA POLICY  
Human rights are a difficult aspect of Sino-American relations not only because 
of the differing American and Chinese perspectives regarding the definition and defense 
of human rights, but also because of domestic issues that further complicate the task of 
policymakers.  These include the lack of consensus in Washington regarding China 
policy, the influence of competing interests groups in the policy making process, and 
finally, the dilemma the issue of human rights creates between protecting national 
interests and upholding American values, which have long played an important role in the 
United States’ foreign policy.   
A. THE BREAKDOWN OF CONSENSUS 
Prior to 1989, human rights did not occupy a prominent role in U.S. China policy.  
In the early decades of the Cold War, the United States government, like the majority of 
the international community, largely ignored the human rights conditions in the PRC for 
a number of reasons.  The PRC’s sheer size, compounded by the lack of specific 
information available about human rights abuses, made the task of properly addressing 
human rights conditions in China daunting for activists and governments alike.  Until the 
mid or late 1970s, foreigners had only limited access to mainland China.  Diplomatic and 
tourist movements were restricted, and few journalists or academics were allowed to 
enter the country, making it very difficult to know what was actually going on inside 
China.48  Furthermore, Beijing did not publish specific facts or figures related to human 
rights abuses and Chinese citizens were unwilling to provide information about such 
things.49  Beijing considered such disclosures to foreigners as treasonous, and it 
encouraged the practice of citizens monitoring and reporting on each other.50  Finally, 
Beijing allowed very few Chinese students to study abroad.  Because of the lack of 
foreign access to information concerning human rights violations, the Chinese 
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government-controlled media was the primary source for information.51  Without 
freedom of speech and a free press, the little information that was available through the 
Chinese press was not considered reliable or accurate.   
Within the United States, there was much debate over what was happening in the 
PRC.  Politicians often painted Chinese human rights conditions as horrific, citing the 
starvation of millions during the Great Leap Forward and the killing and torture of 
millions more during the Cultural Revolution.  In contrast, many academics justified 
China’s circumstances as normal for a society undergoing a revolution.  They hoped that 
socialism would be successful in China because, in spite of the “cruelties and injustices” 
of the Chinese communists, they believed the communists were the “first rulers in a 
hundred years to bring China out of chaos, famine, and weakness.”52  However, the 
debate surrounding Chinese human rights had little impact on U.S. China policy, 
primarily because, from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 until the 1970s, the United 
States did not recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China.  Instead, the 
United States maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on 
Taiwan.   
During the first two decades of the Cold War, the ROC played an integral role in 
the United States’ containment policy toward communist China.  In its efforts to portray 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist (KMT) regime as leaders of a democratic and free society, 
Washington largely overlooked the human rights conditions on Taiwan, which were 
nearly as bad as those on the mainland.  While the KMT was anti-Communist, as a 
Leninist political party, it was far from democratic.  When the Communists gained 
control of the mainland, Chiang retreated to the island of Taiwan along with 
approximately two million civilian and military refugees.53  Once there, Chiang and his 
supporters quickly established a repressive, authoritarian party-state without regard to the 
desires of the island’s preexisting population, who numbered approximately six million.54  
On May 10, 1948, the KMT enacted a set of Temporary Provisions Effective During the 
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Period of Communist Rebellion, which essentially suspended the 1946 Constitution and 
established martial law, enabling the KMT to exercise complete control over the island 
and its residents.55  Over time, the KMT penetrated and took control of almost all 
institutions, including the government, the military, the judicial departments, and 
schools.56  Under Chiang’s authoritarian rule, the Taiwanese people enjoyed few civil 
and political liberties. 
In the early 1970s, certain events led the PRC and the United States toward 
improving relations.  First, after a decade of deteriorating relations following the Sino-
Soviet split in 1960, the PRC determined that the Soviet Union was its greatest external 
threat, downgrading the threat from the United States.  Mao realized China’s interests 
would be better served by obtaining an ally against the Soviet Union than by maintaining 
its isolationist policy.  Mao also recognized that China would never catch up with the 
modern, industrialized countries through the PRC’s policy of “self reliance.”  The PRC 
needed access to foreign technology and investment capital.  On its part, the United 
States hoped that improving relations with the PRC would help check the threat of Soviet 
aggression, as well as expedite its withdrawal from Vietnam.  If the potential success of 
the North Vietnamese could no longer be viewed as a victory by proxy for the 
geopolitical interests of the Chinese communists, then little would remain of the original 
strategic purpose for American intervention in Vietnam.57  For these reasons, after two 
decades of animosity, the PRC and the United States began the process of 
rapprochement. 
In 1971 Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai conducted secret negotiations on behalf 
of their respective states, which culminated in former President Richard Nixon’s visit to 
China in 1972.  Although relations were not normalized until 1979, on February 27, 1972 
the United States and the PRC signed the Shanghai communiqué, establishing the basis 
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for Sino-American strategic cooperation against the threat of the Soviet Union.58  From 
1972 until the end of the Cold War, the United States found it convenient to overlook the 
PRC’s alleged human rights violations in the interests of national security. Although 
there were critics of the U.S. China policy, mainly concerning such issues as support for 
Taiwan and concern for human rights, both the U.S. Congress and the White House 
generally agreed that enlisting the PRC’s aid against the Soviet Union far outweighed 
these matters.   
As a consequence of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, China suffered a 
tremendous setback in its international standing regarding human rights.  The PRC 
government’s brutal military suppression of unarmed civilians incited international 
condemnation, as well as numerous economic and political ramifications that greatly 
affected China’s ability to conduct relations with other nations.   Furthermore, the 
Tiananmen Square massacre closely coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, which changed the strategic nature of the 
relationship between China and many Western countries.  These two events marked a 
major turning point in Sino-American relations and ended the consensus that had largely 
characterized China policy since Nixon’s opening in 1972.  As a result, China policy was 
subject to greater influence by the U.S. Congress, the American public, and other interest 
groups.   
B.   THE INCREASING ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS 
After the Tiananmen crackdown, the American public had a greater awareness of 
the realities of life under the PRC’s communist regime.  Beijing’s decision to use military 
force to suppress its own people eliminated the perception of many in the United States 
that China was following a path of “peaceful evolution” to a more liberal and democratic 
system of government.  Particularly after the wide press coverage given to the Tiananmen 
Square massacre, many Americans demanded that Beijing make significant 
improvements regarding human rights, which made it impossible for Washington to 
continue to overlook human rights violations in China.  Demands were made for a China 
policy review and a tougher stance by the United States Government against Beijing’s 
flagrant human rights violations.  The Bush administration’s continued emphasis on 
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engagement in order to maintain a productive relationship with Beijing brought it into 
direct conflict with Congressional critics who favored a firmer, more sanction-oriented 
approach.  This breakdown in consensus between the White House and the U.S. Congress 
regarding China policy opened the door for NGOs and other organized interest groups to 
exert increasing influence in the policy making process.   
Prior to the 1990s, groups whose interests lay outside the narrow security and 
economic focus of China policy had been marginalized in the policy making process.  
However, as it became more difficult for the administration to formulate a widely 
supported China policy, groups concerned with issues such as abortion, prison labor, 
religious freedom, human rights, nuclear and missile nonproliferation, Tibet, Taiwan, 
Xinjiang, and others expanded their influence and became increasingly involved in 
decisions on China.59  These groups compete in their efforts to advance a policy that 
would best support their respective interests.   
Human rights and labor organizations, religious and social conservatives, and 
arms control advocates were more supportive of a hard-lined approach.  Numerous 
organizations, including religious groups, democracy advocates, and student associations, 
have incorporated human rights issues into their charters or political platforms.  Taking 
advantage of the opportunity presented to advance their interests in the American foreign 
policy process, these groups joined human rights NGOs to criticize Bush’s engagement 
policy.  Two of the most influential NGOs that participated in this effort were AI and 
HRW.  Through AI, over thirty members of Congress “adopted” Chinese citizens 
believed to be political prisoners, and began regularly making inquiries about these 
individuals.60  HRW frequently met with members of Congress as well as officials from 
the State Department, the National Security Council, the Commerce Department, and the 
U.S. Trade Representative’s office to discuss human rights related issues.61  The 
combined efforts of these groups placed tremendous pressure on the White House to use 
its foreign policy to compel Beijing to improve its human rights policies, particularly 
those involving civil, political, and religious freedoms.   
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At the same time, groups representing the American business community were 
typically more supportive of an engagement policy.  The U.S. business lobby consists of 
a broad assortment of groups who are bound by their common economic interests in 
China.  These groups include agribusiness interests and farmers; importers of toys, 
clothing and textiles, electronic products, shoes, and other consumer good manufactured 
in China; high-tech, telecommunications, energy, and manufacturing industries 
concerned with increasing exports; the entertainment industry; and the financial and 
services sectors.62  Human rights violations are of less concern to these groups, who 
desire to maintain smooth relations with China in order to further advance their economic 
interests.   
One of the most influential business organizations is the U.S.-China Business 
Council (the Council).  Founded in 1973 as the National Council for US-China Trade, the 
Council originally served the early efforts of United States business in China in the 
absence of formal diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing.63  The Council 
describes itself as “a private, non-profit, non-partisan, member-supported organization” 
that conducts activities in support of government policies conducive to expanded US-
China commercial and economic ties.64  These activities include educational meetings 
with members of Congress and Congressional staff, and frequent testimony on behalf of 
the U.S. business community in Congressional or other venues.65  It further serves the 
interests of its 260 member corporations by providing market information and advice 
about investing in or trading with China, publishing a bimonthly magazine and a monthly 
newsletter on developments in China’s trade and investment climate, and maintaining a 
U.S.-China Legal Cooperation Fund supported by contributions from some of its member 
corporations.66  Through the efforts of the Council and similar organizations, the U.S. 
business lobby was instrumental in the annual renewal of China’s MFN status throughout 
the 1990s and in granting China PNTR in September 2000. 
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Given the persistent difficulty of formulating a widely supported China policy and 
the numerous and wide ranging issues that confront Sino-American relations, the role 
played by interest groups in the policy making process is not likely to diminish in the 
near future.  On the contrary, interests groups will likely continue to take advantage of 
the opportunity presented to advance a policy that would best support their respective 
positions.   
C. AMERICAN VALUES VERSUS NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Developing an effective China policy in the post-Tiananmen era is difficult not 
only because of the lack of consensus in Washington and the growing influence of 
competing interests groups in the policy making process, but also because of the dilemma 
the issue of human rights creates between protecting national interests and upholding 
American values, which have long played an important role in the United States’ foreign 
policy.  Many people recognize the importance of maintaining a working relationship 
with Beijing; however, the thought of “millions” of Chinese languishing in prison after 
having been denied fundamental civil, political, or religious liberties is hard for the 
American public and many members of Congress to accept.  When addressing the issue 
of human rights in the PRC, policymakers must choose between economic and security 
interests, which often appear to be best served by maintaining a productive relationship 
with Beijing, and upholding basic American values, by condemning Beijing’s flagrant 
human rights abuses.  While improving the human rights conditions in China is a worthy 
goal of American foreign policy, U.S. policymakers must also take into consideration 
other national interests.  These include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
trade disagreements, protecting American intellectual property rights, the unresolved 
question of Taiwan, and, most recently, the war on terrorism.  These numerous and at 
times conflicting interests, combined with the disagreement over whether to “engage” or 
“contain” China, present a particularly difficult dilemma for U.S. policymakers.  In order 
to construct a successful policy, this dilemma must be properly managed.  As 
demonstrated by U.S. policy toward China since 1989, addressing the issue of human 
rights as part of a multi-faceted engagement policy, rather than as the defining issue in 
Sino-American relations, allows for more a productive relationship with Beijing.  
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However, if Washington expects to get results from Beijing, it must take a firm and 
consistent stance on human rights. 
1. China Policy Under the Bush Administration (1989-1992) 
Developing a new China policy in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union was no small task.  Within the United States, debate 
surrounding access to Chinese markets, imported goods made by Chinese prison labor, 
protecting American intellectual property rights, improving human rights and religious 
freedom in the PRC, reducing arms proliferation, and supporting Taiwan against PRC 
aggression made it much more difficult to reach a consensus about how to deal with the 
PRC.  Fortunately, former President Bush recognized the importance of maintaining a 
constructive relationship with the PRC.  Bush was an experienced foreign policy maker 
and was intimately acquainted with the intricacies of Sino-American relations, having 
served as ambassador to the United Nations in 1971 – 1973 and head of the U.S. Liaison 
Office in Beijing in 1974 – 1975.67  In spite of continued pressure from the U.S. 
Congress, various interests groups, and human rights NGOs to retaliate against PRC 
leadership by imposing harsh sanctions, former President George Bush did much to 
minimize the long-term effect of the Tiananmen Square massacre on Sino-American 
relations.68  The Bush administration’s engagement policy toward the PRC enabled the 
continuation of cooperation between American and Chinese leaders and the achievement 
of important American interests.69  Without sacrificing U.S. interests in Asia, Bush 
wanted to further Sino-American cooperation in the face of significant domestic 
opposition.  To this end, Bush implemented measures designed to mollify pressures from 
the U.S. Congress, demonstrate to PRC leaders his sincere desire to maintain productive 
relations, and avoid exacerbating the plight of Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese 
moderates whose position had been weakened by the Tiananmen protests.70  The Bush 
administration conveyed American disapproval over Beijing’s repression of the 
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democracy movement in a manner that allowed the two countries to continue to address 
other important aspects of the relationship as well.    
Following the Tiananmen Square Incident, the United States, along with many 
other Western nations, imposed economic sanctions and other measures against China, 
pressuring Beijing for a change to its human rights policies.  On June 5, 1989, the White 
House announced the suspension of the sale to the PRC of all items on the munitions 
control list, fulfillment of existing agreements for U.S. arms transfers to the PRC, and 
military-to-military contacts.71  On June 20, 1989, the administration decided to 
implement a second round of sanctions, suspending all diplomatic exchanges with the 
PRC at and above the level of assistant secretary, withholding assistance from the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation to U.S. companies working in the PRC, and 
declaring its opposition to World Bank and Asian Development Bank financial assistance 
to the PRC.72  At the same time, President Bush sent a personal note to Deng Xiaoping 
via Ambassador James Lilley conveying his belief that “good relations…are in the 
fundamental interests of both countries.”73  Bush also stated that not only the United 
States but also China had helped to “tie the knot,” therefore, China should help “untie the 
knot” to restore U.S.-China cooperation.74  Bush secretly sent national security advisor 
Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger twice to Beijing 
for discussions with Deng, and following the second visit, the PRC lifted martial law and 
released six hundred prisoners.75  In 1990, the Chinese abstained on the U.N. resolution 
that sanctioned U.S. military intervention in Kuwait, and in reciprocation, the United 
States did not block the World Bank’s first non-human needs loan to the PRC since June 
1989.76  Beyond this, initially the administration saw few tangible results in the areas of 
human rights, weapons proliferation, or trade.   
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In spite of Chinese intransigence and continued criticism from the U.S. Congress, 
from 1989 until mid-1991 the Bush administration persevered with its engagement 
policy.  President Bush even engaged in a veto battle regarding the extension of Chinese 
student visas and China’s MFN status, and he succeeded in part due to his high public 
approval rating as a result of the Gulf War, which peaked at 82 percent in March 1991.77  
Although this rating declined by more than 30 percent by January 1992, due to the 
waning U.S. economy, President Bush continued to dictate China policy as he saw fit.78  
Bush succeeded in extending China’s MFN status again in 1991, resisting attempts by the 
U.S. Congress to link the status with the PRC’s human rights record.  However, this 
success came at a high price, as Bush’s China policy was fast becoming a major 
campaign issue.  In response, Bush adopted a harder line against the PRC. Although 
China greatly resented U.S. efforts, labeling them interference in a domestic issue and a 
violation of international law, Beijing found itself at a serious disadvantage in Sino-
American negotiations due to the events of 1989.  As a result, in the early 1990s China 
made a series of concessions to the United States, regarding the renewal of its MFN 
status, human rights in general, intellectual property rights, and market access.  
Beginning in 1990, the United States threatened to link China’s MFN status with 
its human rights record, and used the occasion of its annual renewal as leverage against 
the Chinese government.  In response, Beijing released 881 Tiananmen prisoners, lifted 
martial law in Beijing, permitted the dissident Fang Lizhi to leave the country, assured 
Secretary of State James Baker that Chinese citizens would not be prevented from 
leaving the country on political grounds, and freed the labor activists Han Dongfang, who 
was near death in prison.79  In more general concessions related to human rights, Beijing 
released some internationally known political prisoners without trial and imposed more 
moderate sentences than normal on others.80  Beijing also agreed to initiate a human 
rights dialogue with U.S. officials, dispatched two human rights delegations to the West, 
and issued government white papers addressing human rights, criminal law, the situation 
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in Tibet, children’s rights, and its controversial family planning program.81  Beijing’s 
actions demonstrate that when confronted with a firm and consistent policy, it will make 
concessions on human rights. 
In addition to these, Beijing made concessions regarding its intellectual property 
rights.  The United States had been dissatisfied with Chinese intellectual property rights 
laws and the U.S.-China trade deficit.  China had implemented a patent law in 1985, but 
Western businesses perceived it to be inadequate and ill enforced.82  In 1991 the U.S. 
threatened trade sanctions if China did not improve its intellectual property rights laws 
and their enforcement.83  Although Beijing protested and threatened counter sanctions, 
they eventually complied.  Beijing agreed to enact new laws and regulations, resulting in 
amendments to Chinese patent laws in 1992, and the implementation of international 
standards over domestic legislation in the case of a dispute.84   
Finally, Beijing yielded to American demands regarding market access.  Due to 
the consistently large U.S./China trade deficit, the United States was concerned with 
opening China’s markets.  In 1992 China acquiesced to a market access agreement that 
gave the United States unprecedented admittance to Chinese markets, exposing the 
Chinese automobile, pharmaceutical, chemical, and other industries to intense foreign 
competition.85  However, the actual result of the agreement did not meet American 
expectations, for two reasons.  The Chinese were slow to implement the terms of the new 
agreement, and when they finally did, local governments further impeded their 
effectiveness by restricting trade in order to protect local business.86   
In spite of these concessions, Bush suffered much criticism alleging that he 
repeatedly “coddled” the dictators of Beijing.87  Criticism surrounding the 
administration’s China policy, on top of the lagging U.S. economy, ultimately 
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contributed to his loss in the 1992 presidential election.  Even so, in retrospect the Bush 
administration’s engagement policy toward the PRC was a success, enabling the 
continuation of cooperation between American and Chinese leaders and the achievement 
of important American interests.  By applying firm and consistent pressure on Beijing 
regarding its human rights abuses, Bush obtained significant concessions from Chinese 
leaders, proving that when pressed the Chinese government will negotiate on human 
rights.    
2.   China Policy Under the Clinton Administration (1993-2000) 
Unlike his predecessor, former President Clinton had little foreign policy 
experience and was far more interested in addressing domestic matters, particularly the 
U.S. economy.  Clinton devoted much less attention to foreign affairs in general and 
Sino-American relations in particular than did former President Bush.  As a result, 
Clinton was more open to influence from the U.S. Congress, partisan politics, and various 
interests groups and NGOs, who often had competing interests.  The administration’s 
policy was further hindered by debate amongst Clinton’s advisors regarding whether to 
adopt “principled engagement,” which focused on human rights improvements, versus 
“commercial engagement,” which focused on furthering economic ties, or “security 
engagement,” which concentrated on furthering military ties to foster better 
understanding and mitigate future conflict.88  The strategy that the Clinton administration 
first employed focused primarily on economic and humanitarian issues and less on the 
national security issues that traditionally formed the basis for Sino-American 
cooperation.  Based upon campaign criticisms that the Bush administration had been soft 
on China, the Clinton administration initially adopted a hard-lined approach toward the 
PRC on the issue of human rights.  However, the Chinese correctly judged that Clinton 
was not entirely committed to the policy, as exemplified by his decision to “delink” 
China’s MFN status from its human rights record in 1994.  Clinton’s inconsistency 
ultimately undermined the administration’s ability to pressure Beijing on the issue of 
human rights.   
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Soon after taking office, in March 1993 Clinton issued Executive Order 128590 
that introduced the linkage between the PRC’s MFN status and its human rights record 
that Bush had successfully blocked.  In this order, Clinton stated that renewal of China’s 
MFN status in 1994 was contingent upon Beijing meeting seven specific guidelines and 
making “overall significant progress” in it’s human rights policies.89  In addition to 
human rights, the Clinton administration condemned Beijing over the issue of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and imposed sanctions against the PRC for 
sales of missile parts to Pakistan.  The administration also accused Beijing of shipping 
ingredients for chemical weapons to Iran and forcibly searched the Chinese ship the 
Yinhe, an effort that uncovered nothing.90  Also during this period, due to Beijing’s 
abysmal human rights record the U.S. Congress expressed its opposition to China hosting 
the 2000 Olympics.  When the games were later awarded to Sydney, Australia, many in 
China blamed the United States.  Further conflict existed over trade disputes and the 
PRC’s failure to meet the requirements for membership in GATT. 
The administration’s hard-lined approach to human rights did not prove as 
effective as it had hoped, for a number of reasons.  First, Clinton alienated Beijing by 
openly announcing the order and demanding that Chinese leaders, who have long been 
defensive about issues involving China’s national sovereignty, publicly acquiesce to 
American demands on what they perceived to be an internal matter.  Second, when 
Clinton issued the Executive Order linking China’s MFN status with it’s human rights 
record, he failed to take into account the changing domestic environment within the 
United States.  Beijing found in the American business community a powerful ally 
against limiting or revoking China’s MFN status.  Many multinational firms and 
economic agencies were in favor of trade with the PRC and began to exert increasing 
pressure on the U.S. Congress to protect American business interests.  Consequently, 
economic and trade-oriented Congressional members criticized the administration, 
asserting they had not been adequately consulted before Clinton decided on the new 
policy.91  Clinton’s top priority had always been the U.S. economy, and the apparent 
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conflict between his human rights agenda and U.S. business interests caused Clinton to 
publicly waver about the linkage policy.  Chinese leaders realized that Clinton was not 
fully committed to the policy, which made them less likely to respond to U.S. demands.    
In a move unanticipated by the Clinton administration, Beijing took a tough 
stance on the issue, threatening the United States with the loss of considerable economic 
opportunities in the Chinese market if the United States continued to link MFN and 
human rights.92  The Chinese calculated correctly that the combined pressures from 
American businesses and Congressional concern for the US economy would isolate the 
proponents of the president’s linkage policy.  Chinese officials were pleased with 
President Clinton’s decision on 26 May 1994 to “delink” the two issues.93  The President 
advised that while China had not made significant progress on any of the issues outlined 
in his 1993 Executive Order, the administration’s tough human rights policy was 
hampering the ability of the United States to address other interests.94  Although the 
United States remained critical of Beijing’s human rights record, the policy reversal 
undermined U.S. efforts to compel change in the Chinese government’s human rights 
policies.  Clinton’s actions reinforced the view of Chinese leaders that business was more 
important to Americans than their principles.95  Since 1994 Beijing has been less willing 
to make concessions based on its human rights record.   
As Clinton himself admitted, not only did the administration’s approach fail to 
bring about significant improvement in human rights, but it also inhibited efforts on other 
important issues, such as Sino-American cooperation to diffuse the North Korean nuclear 
crisis, reducing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and resolving disputes 
over intellectual property rights and the trade deficit.  As a result, the Clinton 
administration revised its strategy, and its policy toward China in his second term more 
closely resembled the approach of his predecessor.  Human rights remained an important 
component of American rhetoric, and the U.S. Congress and human rights NGOs 
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continued to pressure the administration, however, strengthening economic ties and 
taking advantage of the growing Chinese market became the administration’s main 
priority with regard to China.    
Following the MFN debacle, Sino-American relations remained strained.  
President Clinton continued to pay only minimal attention to the China, which allowed 
the U.S. Congress and other interest groups more influence over Sino-American relations.  
This environment contributed to the next crisis that rocked the relationship, the 1995-96 
confrontation over Taiwan.  The PRC watched closely for any signs that the United 
States commitment to the “one China policy” might be wavering.  In 1995, their 
interpretation of a series of events -- including stronger support for Taiwan, Tibet, and 
Hong Kong as entities separate of PRC control, pressure on Chinese trade and other 
economic policies, restriction against the export of military-related and other high 
technology to China, and warnings against Chinese assertiveness in Asia -- led to 
suspicions about the United States’ intentions.96  In June 1995, the Clinton administration 
decided to grant permission for President Lee Teng-hui to make a personal visit to his 
alma matter, Cornell University, in spite of repeated assurances to the PRC that it would 
not. The administration’s reversal was largely due to pressure from the U.S. Congress and 
not the result of a change in policy, but it seemed to confirm PRC fears.   
Beijing interpreted Lee’s trip as evidence of both Lee’s determination to enlarge 
Taiwan’s flexible diplomacy and of Washington’s willingness to support him in doing so, 
which prompted the PRC to recall its Ambassador from Washington on June 16, 1995, 
denounce Lee for moving toward independence, and increase pressure against Taipei, 
including the use of intimidating military exercises.97  During the week of July 21-28, 
Beijing expanded previously scheduled military exercises near the Taiwan Strait to 
include “missile tests” and mock beach landings.98  From March 8-15, Beijing conducted 
a second set of missile tests and other live-fire exercises that were directed very near to 
Taiwan.99  These exercises closely coincided with Taiwan’s March 23 presidential 
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election, but did little to dissuade voters from reelecting President Lee by a healthy 
majority.100  Although they did not affect the outcome of the election, the exercises 
caused other problems for the ROC, by effectively closing large areas of international 
waters, wreaking havoc on Taiwan’s financial markets, and driving capital abroad.101   
Beijing’s use of military force clearly communicated to both the ROC and the 
United States that it still reserved the right to use force in the Taiwan Strait.  The military 
exercises in the Taiwan Strait brought a strong response from the Clinton administration, 
which characterized them as “reckless and provocative.”102  After a meeting with Vice 
Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu failed to bring a response, on March 10 the United States 
dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the waters off Taiwan, signaling to Beijing 
that Washington had the capability to intervene if Beijing launched a direct invasion of 
the island.103  Fortunately, the 1996 crisis over Taiwan ended without incident, but it 
demonstrated the potential for sudden escalation and military confrontation between the 
two nations.  Clinton was forced to reconsider the dangers of ignoring the relationship, 
and a consensus emerged that Sino-American relations needed firmer guidance.104   
As a result, the administration tried to develop a policy that more clearly defined 
U.S. interests and identified incentives that would prompt more cooperative behavior 
from Beijing in support of these interests.105  On May 17, 1996, Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher announced, “The United States and China share many interests that 
can only be served when our two countries deal constructively and openly with each 
other…On some critical issues, we have deep differences.  Our focus must be long term 
and we must seek to resolve our differences through engagement, not confrontation.”106  
The administration’s new strategy, known as “conditional engagement,” aimed to bring 
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the PRC into closer relations with the international community through Beijing’s 
adherence to basic rules and norms of the international system.107  In terms of priority, 
primary emphasis was given to rules related to military and security questions, such as 
the use of force against Taiwan and weapons proliferation, followed by economic issues, 
such as access to the Chinese market, and finally issues of values, such as human rights 
and democracy.108  The administration also moved to stabilize relations and establish 
common ground through more high-level meetings between the two countries.  Anthony 
Lake visited the PRC in July, which paved the way for another high-level visit by 
Secretary Christopher, and ultimately, the Sino-American summits of 1997 and 1998.   
After enunciating the new policy, the tendency of the administration to make 
human rights the defining issue in Sino-American relations diminished, however, the 
administration continued to pressure the Chinese government for change.  In November 
1996, after tensions between Washington and Beijing had relatively decreased, Warren 
Christopher traveled to the PRC and presented Chinese leaders with a new human rights 
proposal.  Washington requested Beijing address four issues, including the imprisonment 
of seven designated political prisoners, China’s failure to sign the ICESCR and the 
ICCPR, Red Cross monitoring of Chinese prisons, and the creation of a joint NGO forum 
on human rights.109  In exchange, Washington would not submit its usual criticism of 
Beijing at the upcoming United Nations Human Rights Commission.  Unfortunately, the 
Chinese leadership did not respond favorably to Christopher’s proposal.  Li Peng rejected 
his offer outright as an intrusion in China’s internal affairs.110 
Following Clinton’s reelection in 1996, the administration continued its efforts to 
improve Sino-American relations and build a broader base for cooperation. The new 
secretary of state, Madeline Albright, believed that in the past China policy had been too 
narrowly focused on the issue of human rights, which impeded cooperation on other 
important issues, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.111  Albright 
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asserted that in order for the United States’ policy to serve the national interest, it should 
be “multifaceted.”112  In Congress, there was growing support for the administration’s 
engagement policy, due in part to Beijing’s efforts to improve relations with 
Congressional members.  In late 1996 and early 1997, several members of Congress 
traveled to China and were impressed by the growing Chinese economy and the potential 
it presented for U.S. businesses.113  However, the obstacles to reaching a consensus on 
China policy and maintaining productive relations with Beijing remained great.  Within 
the United States, public opinion continued to regard the CCP regime as oppressive and 
strategic analysts worried about the possibility of going to war over Taiwan.  Allegations 
concerning questionable financial contributions to the presidential and other political 
campaigns by the Chinese government provided additional ammunition to the 
administration’s critics.114   
As the Clinton administration focused increasingly on economic and security 
matters, the issue of human rights largely receded into the background of its China 
policy.  However, Beijing’s human rights abuses were still the subject of much debate 
within the United States, and the administration was criticized for failing to establish 
human rights preconditions for the October 1997 Sino-American summit.115  The summit 
produced tangible economic results, but made little progress on human rights.  Clinton’s 
visit to China in June 1998 was also criticized by human rights activists, for his failure to 
schedule meetings with Chinese dissidents.  Instead, in an effort to deliver a message to a 
broader section of Chinese society, the administration had requested that Chinese leaders 
broadcast live President Clinton’s speech at Beijing University.  Following his speech, 
Clinton adeptly fielded potentially inflammatory questions in an open and direct manner 
that reflected the transparency of the democratic system he represented.116  However, the 
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effectiveness of this event was muted due to actions taken by the Chinese government, 
which included the failure to publicize the speech and poor translation.117    
During the final two years of the Clinton administration, Sino-American relations 
continued to be plagued by difficulties.  Domestically, human rights advocates and other 
critics continued to berate Clinton’s China policy, particularly after new allegations 
surfaced that the administration allowed U.S. national security to be compromised by 
authorizing Loral Space and Hughes Electronics to export sensitive rocket technology to 
the Chinese, thereby providing Beijing with the ability to strike U.S. cities with more 
accurate missiles.118  Following India and Pakistan’s nuclear test detonations in May 
1998, accusations abounded that the PRC’s nuclear and missile collaboration violated 
nonproliferation agreements and past assurances to Washington.119  In May 1999, a 
declassified portion of a report issued by the Cox Committee earlier in the year asserted 
that the PRC had engaged in protracted and exhaustive efforts to obtain American 
military and commercial secret and proprietary technologies.120   
In spite of domestic critics, the Clinton administration gained ground on some 
important security and economic issues.  Beijing agreed to the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and offered some 
assurances to curtail nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran.121  However, Clinton’s 
policies failed to make substantive gains on the issue of human rights.  In 1999, troubled 
by slowing economic growth, increasing unemployment, sporadic unrest around the 
country, rampant corruption, and the upcoming tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen 
Square democracy protests, the Chinese government began a systematic effort to round 
up known dissidents and potential political organizers.122  In response, Washington made 
an unsuccessful bid for a resolution condemning Beijing’s human rights policies at the 
UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.  Later that year, Beijing further offended 
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human rights activists by cracking down on members a Chinese spiritual movement 
known as Falun Gong.  On April 25, 1999 thousands of Falun Gong practitioners staged a 
peaceful protest outside of Zhongnanhai, the official compound in Beijing for top CCP 
leaders.  Prior to the day of the protest, the CCP had no knowledge of the group’s 
existence, however, an investigation soon revealed it had millions of followers all over 
the country.  The CCP leadership, always wary of groups beyond its control, did not 
hesitate to crush what it saw as a challenge to its authority.  To people in the United 
States, however, this was only the latest example of the PRC’s infringement on religious 
freedoms.  Following the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the 
U.S. Air Force, the PRC suspended human rights dialogue with the United States.    
The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999 
further strained an already deteriorating relationship.  Three Chinese citizens were killed 
and more than twenty injured when a U.S. Air Force B-2 stealth bomber dropped 
precision-guided munitions on what had been mistakenly identified as a legitimate Serb 
military target.123  The incident sparked anti-American demonstrations in many cities 
throughout Beijing.  Beijing responded to the incident by suspending discussions on 
WTO accession, ending its human rights dialogue, and denying requests for U.S. Navy 
port calls in Hong Kong.124  The administration floundered to restore productive 
relations, with little gains made on proliferation, economic, or human rights issues.  
Concerned about criticism from the U.S. Congress, in April 1999 Clinton had sent Zhu 
Rongji back to China without signing an agreement on terms for China’s accession to the 
WTO, even though the Chinese had made significant concessions.  Zhu had traveled to 
the United States despite considerable domestic opposition, and Clinton’s rejection 
strengthened his opponents back in China.  It took months of negotiations, but in 
November 1999 Washington and Beijing finally reached an agreement not unlike the 
initial proposal.  Even so, the relationship remained unsteady.  In a press conference held 
in early 2000, Defense Secretary William Cohen was asked if the administration still 
regarded China as a “strategic partner,” to which he hesitantly replied, “Well, we 
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consider them a, uh, I am not sure that ‘strategic partner’ is the official characterization at 
this point.”125   
Thus, as Clinton’s second term neared its end, Sino-American relations did not 
seem to have progressed much since his inauguration in 1993.  Concerted efforts of 
engagement by former President Bush had allowed for the continuation of cooperation 
between American and Chinese leaders as well as the achievement of important 
American interests, but the relationship lacked a clear vision for the post-Cold War era. 
Throughout his presidency, barring a major crisis, Clinton remained largely disinterested 
in China policy.  This ill-defined, crisis driven approach to managing Sino-American 
relations resulted in further policy drift.    The administration failed to develop a policy 
that was widely supported within the U.S. Congress or well accepted in Beijing, which 
allowed competing interests groups to exert more influence over the policy making 
process.  As a consequence, the Clinton administration left behind a legacy of unresolved 
problems, including the issue of human rights.  Following the president’s decision to 
“delink” China’s MFN status from its human rights policies, Beijing became less 
convinced of the American commitment to human rights and less willing to make 
concessions for human rights.  By repeatedly rejecting Washington’s human rights 
proposals, emphasizing the importance of national sovereignty, and highlighting its need 
to maintain social stability, the Chinese leaders aimed to convince the U.S. government 
that it would never negotiate over human rights.126  However, the concessions Beijing 
made when faced with strong and consistent pressure by the previous administration 
contradict such an assertion. 
3. China Policy Under the Current Administration      
As the former Texas governor, President George W. Bush was also new to the 
conduct of foreign relations, and his initial handling of Sino-American relations was not 
unlike Clinton’s.  During his presidential campaign, Bush advisors had repeatedly 
emphasized national missile defense (NMD) and relations with Russia and China in their 
foreign policy discussions.  In September 2000, Richard Armitage criticized the 
Democratic foreign policy platform, stating that “apparently Democrats see the most 
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important strategic relationship [in Asia] as being with a communist country, China.”127  
In November, Condoleezza Rice commented, “It would be wrong to think of China as an 
enemy, but it is not wrong to think of China as a challenge.”128  These comments were 
unsettling in Beijing, where Chinese leaders closely monitored the presidential campaign 
in an effort to determine what the new administration’s policy toward China would likely 
entail.  Bush’s comments regarding Taiwan were even more disturbing to Chinese 
leaders.  During his campaign, Bush repeatedly referenced the “special status” Taiwan 
held with the U.S. government and the American people as a fellow democracy and the 
obligations of the U.S. government to help defend Taiwan against the use of force by 
mainland China outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act.129  
Given his campaign rhetoric, it was not surprising that once elected, President 
Bush adopted a hard line against the Chinese government on Taiwan, human rights, 
weapons proliferation, and other issues.  The new administration made it clear that it 
viewed China as the United States’ main long-term security threat.  Bush’s 
characterization of China as a “competitor, not a strategic partner” and his enthusiastic 
support for developing a theater missile defense (TMD) system alarmed Chinese leaders.  
Washington’s attempts to reassure Beijing that construction of a TMD was to protect 
U.S. interests from rogue nations such as North Korea and Iraq rather than directed 
against the PRC did little to alleviate Beijing’s fears.  Chinese leaders have three 
principal concerns regarding the United States’ desire to develop TMD.  First, China has 
a limited nuclear arsenal, and Chinese leaders fear TMD would negate the PRC’s 
strategic deterrent.  Second, Beijing suspects TMD is an attempt by Washington to spur a 
major increase in Chinese arms expenditures that could possibly bankrupt China.130  
Finally, TMD would severely hamper Beijing’s reunification plans with Taiwan by 
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eliminating the mainland’s military superiority over the island.  Washington’s disregard 
for Beijing’s objections to its pursuit of TMD, combined with numerous statements 
critical of its policies, fueled anti-American sentiment in China and seemed to validate 
the belief of some Chinese leaders that the United States wanted to impede China’s rise 
in the international system.   
In spite of the administration’s strong rhetoric, Bush did not move quickly to 
establish guidelines for conducting relations with the PRC.  Many observers were 
skeptical of the new administration’s ability to form coherent policy, due to the strong 
personalities and conflicting viewpoints of key members in Bush’s foreign policy team, 
namely, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice.  Ultimately, it took a 
crisis for the Bush administration to focus on developing a specific policy.  On the early 
morning of April 1, 2001, a collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3E performing a routine 
reconnaissance mission along the coast of China and a Chinese Jian-8 fighter plane 
forced the Bush administration to deal with Beijing on a concrete issue.  The collision 
resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot and the unauthorized emergency landing of the 
EP-3E on Hainan Island.   According to the United States, the collision occurred in 
international airspace 112 km from Hainan Island, and resulted from hazardous 
maneuvers on the part of the Chinese fighter.131  The incident brought a strong response 
from Washington, and President Bush demanded that China immediately return the 24 
crewmembers and the EP-3E.  The administration further claimed that the highly 
specialized surveillance aircraft came “within the scope of US sovereignty, and as such, 
Chinese officials were not authorized to board or inspect the plane.”132   
On April 3 PRC President Jiang Zemin responded with China’s demands: the 
United States must “bear full responsibilities” for the incident, make a formal apology to 
the Chinese people, and cease all reconnaissance flights along China’s coastal borders in 
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order to prevent any future accidents.133  Furthermore, in response to the U.S. claim that 
the EP-3E was sovereign U.S. territory, Beijing held that the military aircraft intruded 
into China’s airspace and landed unauthorized on Hainan Island, therefore China had the 
right to inspect the plane.134  Beijing refused to admit the accident resulted from reckless 
flying on the part of the Chinese pilot and further asserted the incident occurred within 
China’s airspace.  The PRC’s English newspaper, the China Daily, criticized Washington’s 
apparent lack of concern for the fate of the Chinese pilot, stating that “Washington’s frosty 
response towards the Chinese pilot’s predicament is indicative of the double standard the 
United States has adopted on human rights….Making mistakes is natural.  But always 
making mistakes detrimental to other countries’ interests or other people’s lives is hardly 
responsible international behavior.”135  Although most evidence showed Beijing knew the 
collision took place over international waters, Chinese leaders needed an excuse to justify 
the Chinese military’s decision to board the aircraft and sequester the crew.136  
Washington dismissed Beijing’s claim that the incident occurred within Chinese airspace 
and was due to a sudden movement of the EP-3E.  Washington further rejected Beijing’s 
demands for an apology, with the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stating bluntly, 
“There is nothing to apologize for.”137  
After the initial escalation of the incident by both the United States and China, 
officials on both sides conveyed a desire to reach a compromise and move past the 
incident without causing permanent setbacks to Sino-American relations.  On April 4, 01, 
Secretary Powell stated, “We regret the Chinese pilot did not get down safely, and we 
regret the loss of life of that Chinese pilot.”138  A few days later, President Jiang stated, 
“Taking into account the important role of both countries, I believe that we should find an 
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adequate solution to this problem.”139  Even while both sides worked behind the scenes to 
resolve the issue, Beijing continued to use the crisis to raise nationalist sentiments at 
home, prove to the world that American military might was not omnipotent, and increase 
the PRC’s military standing within the region.140  Beijing made it clear it would not 
release the U.S. crew or the plane until it was satisfied with the Washington’s response.   
While there were broader geopolitical gains to be made by prolonging the 
episode, China’s leaders did not want to take it so far as to face economic repercussions 
from the United States, which could derail progress in China’s economic reforms.141  
With this in mind, after Washington delivered a letter stating it was sorry for the missing 
pilot as well as the entry into China’s airspace without verbal permission, PRC Foreign 
Minister Tang Jiaxuan declared that since the U.S. government had “apologized” the 
Chinese government would allow the American crew to leave the country, effectively 
ending the twelve day stand-off.142  Although Washington did not meet Jiang’s 
conditions, editorials in China’s state-run media claimed the U.S. “apology” was a 
victory “for the Chinese government and people against the U.S. hegemony,” while 
urging the United States to “work with the Chinese side to bring relations back on a 
normal track.”143  However, many countries in Europe and Asia applauded Washington’s 
pragmatic and controlled response to what was viewed as the first test of the new 
administration’s foreign policy team.  The crisis demonstrated that Washington and 
Beijing could successfully resolve potentially explosive situations through diplomatic 
means.   
Following the successful resolution of the EP-3E crisis, Sino-American relations 
remained tense.  The incident only highlighted tensions between the two countries over 
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security issues, and the Bush administration’s actions throughout the crisis appeared to be 
aimed at damage control rather than a reflection of a well thought out China policy.  The 
administration’s decision on April 24 to sell additional arms to the ROC on Taiwan 
further strained the relationship.  President Bush approved the sale of four Kidd-class 
destroyers, eight diesel- powered submarines, 12 P-3C Orion submarine-hunting aircraft, 
and other advanced weapons and equipment, however, it deferred the more controversial 
sale of Aegis-equipped destroyers.  A senior White House official justified the sale, 
asserting that the revised package would address a regional military balance that had 
“tilted in the People's Republic of China's favor in a dangerous way.”144  The U.S. 
Congress, who has long been concerned about Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from 
mainland aggression, widely supported the administration’s decision.  In contrast, Beijing 
characterized the sale as a “flagrant violation of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, 
especially the one signed on August 17, 1982, and an open provocation to China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”145  Chinese leaders increasingly characterized 
Washington’s actions as part of an “anti-China containment policy.”146  On April 25, 
President Bush commented during an interview with ABC News that he would do 
“whatever it took” to defend Taiwan from an attack by China, which seemed to be a 
dramatic break from past policy.147  Bush’s statement was followed closely by Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s announcement on April 30 that Washington would halt 
military contact with Beijing.148  Although the administration played down Bush’s 
statement and reiterated the United States’ commitment to the “one-China” policy, and 
the Department of Defense recanted the decision to halt military contact only hours after 
it was announced, Beijing remained troubled about U.S. intentions regarding Taiwan.   
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In addition to their conflicting security interests, Washington and Beijing remained 
at odds over the issue of human rights.  In April 2001, Beijing initiated another “strike 
hard” campaign.  During the three months that followed, AI reported that China executed 
more individuals than in the rest of the world combined over the previous three years, and 
many were sentenced to death after unfair trials, based on confessions extracted under 
torture.149  In July 2001, following Beijing’s successful bid to host the 2008 Olympic 
games, China convicted three scholars on charges of supplying intelligence to Taiwan.  AI 
has documented many cases of individuals imprisoned on similar charges of "leaking 
state secrets" or "state security offenses" who had merely been dealing with readily 
available public information, and believed the three scholars to be prisoners of 
conscience.150  Dr. Gao Zhan and Dr. Tan Guangguang were permanent U.S. residents and 
Dr. Li Shaomin was a naturalized U.S. citizen.  All three had been held without trial since 
earlier in the year.  Although the three scholars were later released in what HRW 
characterized as a gesture aimed at improving Sino-U.S. relations, many others remained in 
custody as a result of their research.151  Neither U.S. diplomatic efforts nor increased 
international scrutiny related to the Olympics motivated Beijing to make tangible 
improvements to its human rights policies. 
In August 2001, Secretary Powell traveled to Beijing in preparation for the 
upcoming talks between Presidents Jiang and Bush scheduled in conjunction with the 
October APEC summit.  In an effort to improve relations, the Bush administration toned 
down its rhetoric that portrayed China more as an emerging enemy than as a potential 
partner.  Secretary Powell conveyed a message to President Jiang, Premier Zhu, Vice 
Premier Qian, and Foreign Minister Tang that President Bush wanted “to build 
constructive, forward-looking relations with the People's Republic of China.”152  The 
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proposed agenda for the Bush-Jiang meeting included a wide range of issues, including 
security concerns, trade and commerce issues, human rights, nonproliferation, and others.  
While human rights activists were glad to see the issue would be raised, the administration 
was criticized in general for its failure to develop a clear policy to promote human rights 
and specifically for its failure to advocate cases of specific dissidents or adopt a position on 
Beijing’s ongoing crackdown on minorities in Xinjiang.153  In September 2000 Premier 
Zhu had called for an “iron fist” to crush suspected Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang, and 
officials in the region had carried out the “strike hard” campaign with particularly 
disastrous results. 154  Beijing’s increasingly harsh policies toward the region attracted 
criticism from many human rights NGOs, but the U.S. government had largely excluded 
the issue from its human rights dialogue with Chinese leaders.   
Although the administration was optimistic about the upcoming Bush-Jiang 
meeting, few individuals outside of the administration expected many significant results.  
After eight months in office, the administration still had not articulated a coherent China 
policy.  Bush’s often inflammatory remarks toward the PRC frequently contradicted with 
assertions from U.S. State Department officials that the United States did not “view China 
as an enemy,” but rather shared “common interests with China that are best served by a 
productive and forward looking relationship.”155  Once again, it took a crisis to redirect the 
relationship.  The tragic events of September 11 presented the Bush administration with an 
urgent security threat that necessitated the immediate stabilization of relations with Beijing.  
As it worked to build an international coalition against Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist 
network, Washington could ill afford to antagonize Beijing with inflammatory rhetoric 
concerning Taiwan or other security issues.  Beijing recognized the opportunity presented 
by the war on terrorism to further its own interests, and President Jiang was one of the first 
international leaders to telephone his condolences to Washington following the surprise 
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terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  As a consequence of the 
September 11 attacks, the United States and China once again had common security threat 
that facilitated cooperation.  However, the human rights implications of Beijing’s 
September 18 request that Washington “give its support and understanding” to China’s 
own fight against “terrorism and separatists” in Xinjiang presented the Bush 
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IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM: 
CASE STUDY OF XINJIANG 
The on-going American war on terrorism has significant implications for the 
PRC’s western-most province, the XUAR, and elevated the issue of human rights to the 
forefront of Sino-American relations.  Following the September 11th attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon and the American declaration of war on international 
terrorism, Beijing jumped at the opportunity to lobby the international community for 
support with its own decades-long “terrorist” problem: the continuing social unrest and 
violence in the XUAR.  Over the past few years, Beijing has made a concerted effort to 
establish regional support for its crackdown on Uyghur separatists in the XUAR.  Beijing 
has achieved some success, namely the establishment in 1996 of the Shanghai Five, 
which included the PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  In 2001 the 
Shanghai Five expanded with the admission of Uzbekistan and was renamed the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  This organization is committed to the eradication of 
terrorism and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Central Asian region.  
Beijing’s latest efforts elevates the situation in the XUAR to the international level and 
presents Washington with an all too familiar dilemma: uphold the importance of human 
rights or subordinate them to other, more pressing national interests.  Specifically, the 
question is: should the United States condone Beijing’s crackdown on the XUAR’s 
Uyghur ethnic minority, which has resulted in some of the worst human rights violations 
in the country and obviously contradicts the United States’ human rights policy toward 
the PRC, in order to gain the Beijing’s support for its war on terrorism?   
For over a year, Washington refused to acknowledge the Uyghurs as terrorists.  
However, it became increasingly difficult to deny some Uyghur extremists’ links to 
Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist network, particularly after U.S. forces encountered Uyghurs 
fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Even so, the challenge remained for 
Washington to acknowledge this connection without giving Beijing blanket approval for 
its harsh and often inappropriate policies in the region.  These policies, designed to 
protect the territorial integrity of the PRC by integrating the predominantly Uyghur 
minority population into a multinational, unitary state and isolating the Uyghur secession 
54 
movement from international support, are in fact having the opposite effect.  Resentment 
against the central government and tensions between the Uyghurs and Han Chinese 
within the XUAR have steadily increased, culminating in acts of violence by some 
Uyghur separatists.  Beijing responded to these events by implementing increasingly 
harsh policies, and, correspondingly, the region boasts the country’s most severe human 
rights violations.  As a result, the plight of the Uyghurs and other minorities living in 
Xinjiang inspired protests from NGOs and foreign governments alike.  
In order for Washington to respond appropriately to Beijing’s overtures, it must 
first understand the circumstances surrounding the violence and unrest in XUAR.  These 
include identifying who the Uyghurs are and why they are upset with the Chinese 
government, why the XUAR is important to Beijing, why Beijing perceives the Uyghurs 
as a threat, and how Beijing has chosen to deal with the perceived Uyghur threat both 
domestically and internationally. 
A. WHO ARE THE UYGHURS?  
1. Uyghurs Today 
The Uyghurs are ethnically a Turkic people, primarily Muslim, who live in the 
northwestern part of China known as Xinjiang, officially called the Xinjiang-Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR).  Xinjiang is the largest of China’s province-level 
administrative units, accounting for one-sixth of the total Chinese territory.  According to 
the official 1990 Chinese census there are 7,194,675 Uyghurs living in Xinjiang, 
approximately 47 percent of the total population.157  There are also 500,000 Uyghurs 
living in Uzbekistan, Kazakistan, Kirgizistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and 
approximately 150,000 Uyghurs living in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
Western Europe, and the United States.158  The Uyghurs are one of 55 official minority 
nationalities (shaoshu minzu) of the PRC.  The PRC identifies these nationalities 
according to the criteria of having a common history, territory, language, economic life, 
and culture.159  Although more than 400 separate groups applied for this status, the first 
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census published in 1953 listed only 41 nationalities, which included the majority Han.160  
This number grew to 53 after the 1964 census, and finally to 56 in 1982.161   
2. Historical Background 
The Uyghurs, like the Chinese, have a long history marked by periods of great 
strength and relative weakness.  Throughout history, Uyghur society, religion, and culture 
changed as the Uyghurs adapted to environmental changes and foreign influences.  
Therefore, the term “Uyghur” connotes different meanings depending upon which period 
in Uyghur history is of concern.  Surprisingly, the term “Uyghur” as it is known today 
originated in the early 1930s. 
Historical records trace Uyghurs back to 400 A.D.  At this time, Uyghurs where 
one of nine Turkic Tiele tribes who lived in the Central Asian region between Korea and 
Karasher, where they were ruled by a people known as the Juan-juan. 162  Early Uyghurs 
were a nomadic people who practiced Shamanistic beliefs.  This early period in Uyghur 
history lasted for approximately 150 years, until another tribe called the Tujue conquered 
the Juan-juan in the middle of the 6th Century.163  The Tujue used the Uyghurs to govern 
the wild regions of the north.  In 582, the Tujue split into 2 political groups, known as the 
Eastern and the Western.164   
The Western Tujue attempted to keep the Tiele under their domination, but they 
were not successful.165  The Uyghurs gained their independence and over the course of 
the next century assisted the Chinese in several campaigns against a number of 
adversaries.  In 647, the various Tiele tribes were placed under Chinese protection.166  
Toward the end of the 7th Century until 716, the Uyghurs again came under Tujue 
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domination.167  Following the death of Tujue leader Moche, the Uyghurs regained their 
independence and, according to a Tang history, “they gradually became powerful.”168  As 
the Uyghurs’ power grew, they expanded their territory, and by 744 had established an 
empire in northwestern Mongolia, with its capital located in Karabalghasun.169  During 
this period, the Uyghurs adopted Manichaean beliefs, and grew politically, socially, and 
culturally.  They began to build cities, develop agriculture, and conduct commerce, 
although in the rural parts of the Uyghur empire nomadic stock raising continued to be 
the norm.170  Archaeologists have uncovered signs that among the Uyghurs existed 
metallurgists, potters, engravers, blacksmiths, sculptors, weavers, and jewelers.171  The 
Uyghur empire lasted until 840, when the Kirghiz invaded Uyghur territory and drove 
them out.  
After their defeat, many Uyghurs relocated to Turpan.  During the period 844 
until 932, the Uyghurs were known as a sedentary, oasis society that was Buddhist and 
Nestorian Christian as well as Manichaean.172  The year 932 marked the beginning of the 
third and longest period in Uyghur history.  From this time until 1450, the term Uyghur 
referred to an elite, primarily Buddhist, Turkic society centered in the Turpan oasis, 
which the Uyghurs called Uyghuristan.173  During this time, the term “Uyghur” was used 
to discriminate this society from the Islamic Turks living to the west.  After the Buddhist 
Turks converted to Islam in the fifteenth Century, the term fell into disuse for 500 
years.174  However, the people previously known as Uyghurs continued to exist, and in 
1759 they came under the control of the Chinese when the Qing dynasty conquered their 
territory.   
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The Qing encountered significant resistance to their rule, and in 1862 the 
indigenous peoples drove them out.  The indigenous peoples enjoyed a brief 
independence until 1876 when the Qing reasserted their control over the region.  At this 
time, the Qing named the region Xinjiang, which means “new territory.”  The Qing 
encouraged the migration of Han Chinese into the region and attempted to pacify the 
indigenous peoples by encouraging interracial marriage and forcing them to adopt 
Chinese customs.175  However, as the Qing’s power declined, so did its ability to 
administer Xinjiang.   
After the fall of the Qing in 1912, the newly established nationalist government 
constantly battled to maintain control over Xinjiang.  The ruler of Xinjiang during the 
first few years of the nationalist government was Yang Zengxin.176  Han was a very 
conservative leader and attempted to prevent the Uyghurs’ access to outside influences, 
such as the Soviet Union.  Yang also banned publications in Turkic languages, censored 
mail, and posted signs in Xinjiang forbidding political discussion.177  Yang’s policies did 
little to quell Muslim unrest or endear the indigenous peoples to the new nationalist 
government.  In 1933, a rebellion broke out in northern Xinjiang, and a Turkic Muslim 
state called the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was established.  However, it was 
summarily suppressed by Yang’s successor, a warlord named Sheng Shicai.    
Sheng, who was heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, ruled Xinjiang from 
1933 until 1944.  In 1934, Sheng proclaimed his “six great principles,” the first three 
being anti-imperialism, kinship to the Soviet Union, and equality among the 
nationalities.178  In spite of these principles, Sheng was anti-Islamic.  Sheng targeted the 
Muslims because he saw them and their religion as sources of secessionist and nationalist 
opposition to his rule, much in the same way the current government views the Muslims 
of Xinjiang.179  During this period, at the suggestion of the Soviet Union, the Chinese 
government revived the term “Uyghur” to describe the Turkic Muslim oasis dwellers 
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living in Xinjiang.180  Prior to that, these groups referred to themselves according to their 
locality and were called the Kashgar-lik, Turpan-lik, Aksu-lik, as well as the Taranchi, 
Turki, and Sart.181  Although most did not directly descended from the Uyghurs of old, 
these groups were more than happy to be officially recognized as something other than 
Han Chinese.  The “Yellow Uyghurs” are the only group who directly descended from 
the Uyghurs who fled the Kirgiz invasion in 840 A.D.  The Yellow Uyghurs live in their 
own autonomous county in Gansu.  They have most closely preserved the linguistic, 
cultural, and religious ties with the Uyghurs of old, by retaining their former Turkish 
language and incorporating Manichaean practices in their Lamaist-Buddhist religion.182 
During his 11-year rule, Sheng initiated many pro-Soviet policies that were 
primarily atheistic in nature.  Sheng promoted Soviet ideas and practices, closed down 
mosques or converted them into clubs or theaters, encouraged women to unveil, and 
publicly ridiculed Islamic clergy.183  These policies further incited the Muslims of 
Xinjiang, and in 1937 a Muslim-led rebellion broke out in southern Xinjiang.  In the 
latter years of his rule, Sheng’s persecution of Muslims increased.  Many Muslims were 
arrested and imprisoned, others were sent to work in mines, and some were killed.  
Resistance to Sheng’s rule continued until he finally left Xinjiang in September 1944.  
Later that same year, another secessionist rebellion broke out that established the second 
East Turkestan Republic, which ruled until 1949.  Following the communists’ victory in 
the Chinese civil war in 1949, the PRC effectively reasserted control over Xinjiang.  
However, many Uyghurs continue to be dissatisfied with their status as citizens of the 
PRC, and maintain they are a separate people who deserve to assert their right of self-
determination and establish their own nation.   
3. The Uyghur Language 
The native language of the Uyghurs is Uyghur.  Uyghur is distinct from the 
Mandarin Chinese spoken by the majority of Hans that live in Xinjiang.  Uyghur is a 
Turkic language belonging to the Altaic language family and is written in a traditional 
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Arabic script.184  Furthermore, the Uyghur language does not contain tones, which makes 
learning Mandarin difficult for most Uyghurs.185  The subject of language is a sensitive 
issue in Xinjiang.  Uyghurs regard their language as a unique and important part of their 
culture.  Many Uyghurs feel that the PRC desires to slowly phase out the use of their 
language, as evident by government policies that restrict the use of Uyghur in schools and 
limit the publication of books and other literary materials in Uyghur.  Most recently, the 
Chinese authorities announced that as of September 2002 Xinjiang University, the top 
university in Xinjiang, will no longer teach courses in the local Uyghur language.186  An 
official spokesperson from Xinjiang University stated that change in policy resulted from 
the lack of textbooks translated into Uyghur, and the need to raise the level of education 
of local Uyghur students.187  The official maintained that students who learned in 
Mandarin would have a better chance of finding employment after graduation.188  
However, Uyghurs cite the policy as another effort by the central government to eradicate 
their language and with it a substantial part of their identity.  
4. Economic Status 
In 1992, Xinjiang had 47.01 million mu (3.136 million hectares) of arable land or 
3 mu per capita.189  Not surprisingly, the majority of Uyghurs are peasant farmers, and 
Xinjiang is one of China's top producers of cotton and grain.  In Turpan, Uyghurs 
primarily cultivate and sell grapes using an indigenous irrigation system known as 
karez.190  In southern Xinjiang, land not used for grapes is alternately planted with wheat 
and sorghum one season and cotton the next.191  In 1990, agricultural products accounted 
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for 34.1 percent of the regional economy.192  In 1992, the annual income for farmers and 
urban residents in Xinjiang was 740 RMB and 1753 RMB respectively.193  Economic 
reforms began in Xinjiang in the early 1980s, but instead of producing greater stability 
and social cohesiveness, they seem only to have exacerbated the longstanding divisions 
between the Uyghurs and the Han.  This is primarily because Han Chinese, rather than 
Uyghurs, are the primary beneficiaries of the benefits resulting from the government’s 
development programs.  
5. Education  
In Xinjiang, the education of Uyghurs and Han Chinese is conducted separately, 
and there is a wide disparity between the quality of facilities and instruction provided to 
the respective groups.  In 1990, the illiteracy rate of Uyghurs averaged 26.58 percent, 
compared to the national average of 22 percent.194  However, in the rural areas of 
Xinjiang, the percentage of illiterate individuals is most likely higher.    Many peasant 
families cannot afford the fees required to send their children school, and others are so 
poor that their children begin working at an early age rather than attending school.  In 
some villages, schools are not large enough to accommodate all the students.  Not 
surprisingly, the pursuit of higher education among Uyghurs is also limited, due to 
poverty constraints and the lack of institutions that offer classes in Uyghur.  Most Uyghur 
youths are not fluent in Chinese and are subsequently unable to attend the state 
universities, where classes are almost exclusively taught in Mandarin.  The low level of 
education among Uyghurs contributes to their inability to find good jobs. 
6. Religion and Islamic Fundamentalism 
The majority of Uyghurs are Muslim, and there are more than 24,000 mosques 
and over 27,000 Muslim clerics in Xinjiang.195  However, there is a difference between 
the practice of Islam in Xinjiang and the practice of Islam in the Middle East.  Uyghur 
                                                 
192 “Xinjiang Reading Notes” 
193 Ibid. 
194 Yuan Xin, “Ethnic Uyghurs,” Internet. Available from http://www.usembassy-
china.org.cn/english/sandt/xjnotes.htm; accessed on 11 June 2002. 
195 Chen Guo Hua, “8,000 Islamic Chinese,” Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen Wang, 4 January 2002, in 
“PRC Gives 8,000 Mosque Leaders Standardized Training in Xinjiang,” FBIS Document 
CPP20020108000162, 8 January 2002. 
61 
Muslims are far more secularized than their Middle Eastern counterparts.  Additionally, 
the Islamic beliefs of Uyghurs often incorporate characteristics of earlier religions 
practiced in the region, such as Manichaeanism, Buddhism, and Nestorianism.  Uyghurs 
vary in the extent to which they practice Islam.  Some are very strict, others observe only 
the minimal requirements, and some do not practice at all.  Beijing’s repressive religious 
policies -- such as requiring registration and government supervision of all mosques, 
forbidding religious activity for people under the age of 18, and punishing any party 
members or government officials who fast during Ramadan -- make it difficult for 
Uyghurs to practice their faith.   
Particularly since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack against the United 
States, there has been much attention given to the question of Islamic fundamentalism in 
Xinjiang.  In general, Uyghurs deny the existence of Islamic extremism in Xinjiang, and 
for the most part this is true.  Due to the secularized nature of Uyghur Islamic beliefs, 
they are not very conducive to extremist views.  However, a small number of Uyghurs 
have joined extremist organizations.  The Xinjiang Liberation Front and Uyghur 
Liberation Organization, which operate out of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, have been 
blamed for assassinations in Xinjiang of Uyghur officials labeled as collaborators.196  
Other Uyghurs have left Xinjiang to fight alongside such organizations in neighboring 
countries.  For example, some Uyghurs are associated with the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan.197  Additionally, in 1999, three Uyghurs were being held in a Musad Jail in 
the Panjshir Valley, after being trained by the Taliban and being captured fighting against 
the Northern alliance.198  In January 2000, Uyghur militants were reportedly shot in 
Kashmir after receiving training in Pakistan.199  Also in the year 2000, the Russian 
Defense Ministry captured Uyghur prisoners of war in Chechnya.200   Finally, there have 
been some allegations concerning Uyghurs fighting in organizations associated with 
Osama bin Laden.  In 2001, U.S. forces in Afghanistan reportedly captured a small 
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number of Uyghurs fighting alongside the Taliban in the course of the “war on 
terrorism.”  Although Beijing requested these individuals, who still hold Chinese 
citizenship, be returned to the PRC to be dealt with according to the law, to date they 
remain in Cuba under U.S. custody with the rest of the detainees.  Most significantly, on 
August 26, 2002, after months of petitioning from Beijing, the Bush administration 
designated the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization.  
Even so, these instances of Uyghur participation in Islamic extremist movements 
represent a small percentage of the Uyghur population.  The majority of Muslim Uyghurs 
consider themselves secular, and although they advocate independence from the PRC, 
they want to establish a democratic, progressive state rather than an Islamic 
fundamentalist one.   
B. UYGHUR GRIEVANCES 
Beijing likes to blame Uyghur unrest on a “small number” of “separatists, 
terrorists, and religious extremists” who are aligned with “foreign hostile forces” that 
want to “split the motherland.”201  In reality the Uyghurs are driven more by their 
dissatisfaction with central government policies than outside forces or their desire to 
establish an Islamic state.  Over the past few decades, the Uyghurs have compiled a list of 
substantial grievances against the Chinese government.  However, to date these issues are 
largely ignored by Beijing, and any complaints are dealt with harshly.  The CCP labels all 
challenges to its rule, however minute, as “splittism,” punishable by a lengthy prison term 
or even death.202  As a result, many Uyghurs are afraid to speak out against Chinese rule 
or even to complain about their daily lives or low standards of living.  Uyghurs living in 
exile, however, are not afraid and are making their complaints known.  The major 
grievances against Beijing involve political persecution, religious repression, education 
and economic discrimination, nuclear testing, coercive birth control policies, and cultural 
genocide. 
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1. Political Persecution 
Beijing’s official policy toward minority nationalities is to grant them a certain 
amount of autonomy, but never the option of independence.  Minority populated areas 
compose five autonomous regions, 31 autonomous prefectures, 96 autonomous counties 
and banners, and numerous autonomous villages.203  In this instance, autonomy refers to 
the right to have minority members hold government offices and exert some political 
control over their own areas concerning such matters as resource administration, taxes, 
birth planning, education, legal jurisdiction, and religious expression.204  However, this 
does not necessarily translate into political power.  Even in autonomous areas, the Han 
majority continues to dominate the CCP, were the real political power lies.  This is true in 
Xinjiang, where the few Uyghur government officials answer to Han CCP bosses.  As 
such, the Uyghurs feel they have no true representation in government and regard the few 
Uyghur officials as token members of the Chinese government.   
More serious than the lack of political autonomy is the prevalence of political 
persecution in Xinjiang.  The arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of Uyghurs who 
peacefully exercise their rights of speech and association, among others, is widespread.  
Many political detainees and prisoners are held for long periods, some times weeks or 
even months, without legal counsel or contact with relatives.  Torture of political 
prisoners in order to obtain a “confession” is common throughout China, but the methods 
employed in Xinjiang are particularly brutal.  They include severe beatings, electric 
shocks, shackling in positions that cause immense pain, exposure to extreme 
temperatures, the insertion of needles under the nails or the removal of fingernails, the 
use of unidentified injections, the insertion of pepper, chili powder, or other substances 
into the nose, mouth, or genitals, and the insertion of horse hairs or wires into male 
genitalia.205  Political trials in Xinjiang are typically a formality, as the verdict is usually 
pre-determined by the political authorities.206  Some detainees are simply informed of 
their sentences without receiving a trial, while others are subjected to “mass sentencing 
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rallies,” which are show trials attended by hundreds or thousands of people, during which 
their sentences are announced.207  Finally, many political prisoners in Xinjiang have 
reportedly died in custody, due to torture, ill treatment, or the lack of proper medical 
care.208     
2. Religious Repression  
The PRC is officially an atheist state.  Even so, the 1982 PRC Constitution 
guarantees religious freedom, stating “citizen’s of the People’s Republic of China have 
the right to religious belief.  No state organ, public organization, or individual may 
compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate 
against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.”209  However, there is a 
condition to this right.  In addition to affirming citizen’s rights to religious belief, the 
PRC Constitution distinguishes between “normal religious activities” and using religion 
to the detriment of the state.  This is partly due to the government’s association of 
religion with separatist movements.  Due to its overriding concerns for security, Beijing’s 
policies concerning religious freedom in Xinjiang are particularly strict, making them one 
of the most inflammatory issues in Xinjiang.  Beijing’s recent campaigns to “rectify the 
social order” have caused widespread arbitrary arrests, closure of places of worship, 
crackdowns on traditional religious activities, prohibition of personal religious practices 
by government personnel or in government-owned facilities, and the sentencing of 
thousands to harsh prison terms or death after grossly unfair and often summary judicial 
proceedings.210   
According to Human Rights Watch, violations of religion freedoms have 
increased considerably in recent years, particularly following September 11, 2001.  Only 
officially sanctioned mosques, imams and Islamic schools are authorized, and many 
imams are required to attend a religious training program at one of Xinjiang’s three 
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official schools of Islamic scripture.  In the past year, 8,000 mosque leaders received 
training at the schools, which were founded to “thoroughly and correctly implement Party 
religious policies, uphold normal religious activities of the vast population of believers, 
safeguard national unity and the stable development of Xinjiang, and rectify a shortage of 
qualified clerics.”211   
In Xinjiang, even officially sanctioned mosques and imams are closely 
supervised.  Mosques are subject to closure by the government, and imams who displease 
the authorities face immediate retaliation, including “patriotic reeducation,” arrest, fines, 
or lengthy prison sentences.  According to the Urumqi Yearbook 2000, a government 
publication, Yusaiyin Wubulibei, former imam of the Shayibake Mosque in Urumqi, was 
demoted and put under investigation by the Public Security Bureau (police) in April 1999 
for having "preached against the “religious policies of the Party” and “exacerbated 
contradictions within the patriotic clergy.”212  The authorities have also banned personal 
religious practices in all state organizations.  Students at state schools and universities are 
formally forbidden to pray, keep the fast during Ramadan, or show any pious 
behavior.213  The possession of a Quran alone can lead to discrimination.  In rural areas, 
security forces conduct periodic searches to ensure that no “illegal publications” or 
“illegal religious materials.”214  Due to these policies, many Uyghurs are afraid to attend 
religious prayers, gatherings, or any other public religious activity. 
3. Discrimination  
Many Uyghurs are discouraged by what they see as the lack of equal opportunity 
in education, health care, and employment.  Unlike their Chinese counterparts, many 
Uyghur schools and hospitals are in disrepair.  In some villages, Uyghur schools are 
reported to be so poorly funded and equipped that students sit and write on the earthen 
floor.215  Due to annual fees for many elementary, middle, and high schools, many 
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families cannot afford to send their children to school.  Additionally, only 3 percent of 
Uyghur high school graduates are able to attend higher education.216     
Xinjiang is one of the unhealthiest provinces in China, because of widespread 
pollution, ecological damage, nuclear testing, and poverty.217  The Uyghurs suffer the 
most from this environment.  In Xinjiang, 80 percent of health care facilities are 
concentrated in the cities.218  Because of the shortage of hospitals and other medical 
facilities in most villages in Xinjiang, many people rely on folk medicines or unregistered 
medical clinics.  These clinics often fail to meet even the lowest health standards, but are 
still crowded with Uyghurs who have no other options.  The majority of doctors working 
in Xinjiang are Han Chinese who do not speak Uyghur, which makes it difficult for many 
Uyghur patients to explain their problems.  Partly because of the inadequate medical care 
available in Xinjiang, the average life expectancy has fallen from 65 years in 1949 to 45 
years today.219  Perhaps the most serious medical problem confronting the Uyghurs is 
HIV/AIDS.  Since 1994, widespread heroin use in the region has resulted in an 
HIV/AIDS crisis, making Xinjiang the most seriously infected region and the Uyghurs 
the most seriously infected population in all of China.220  This problem is further 
complicated because in Xinjiang there are no anti-retroviral drugs available, no hospitals 
prepared to treat patients with full-blown AIDS, and testing is prohibitively expensive.221     
In spite of the economic development in Xinjiang in recent years, many Uyghurs 
are unemployed.  Many of the newly established industrial plants monopolize scarce 
resources at the expense of the indigenous population, but hire primarily Han Chinese 
who recently migrated to the region.  Only 10 percent of the 200,000 industrial workers 
in Urumqi are Uyghur.222  Many Uyghurs live in poverty.  According to 1992 statistics, 
the per capita income of Kashgar, Hotan, and Kezhou were below the Xinjiang average, 
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at 669 RMB, 453 RMB, and 431 RMB, respectively.223  Even Uyghurs with higher 
education have difficulty finding jobs, which reduces the incentive for other youths to 
pursue advanced degrees.   
4. Coercive Birth Control Policies 
Many Uyghurs complain about the coercive birth control policies enforced by the 
government in an effort keep China’s population under control.  Furthermore, Amnesty 
International is concerned that the implementation of the government’s policy has 
resulted in numerous human rights violations, including forced abortions and 
sterilizations and arbitrary arrests made in the aftermath of attacks on family planning 
offices or birth control officials.224  The primary victims of these violations are women, 
and forced abortions have allegedly been carried out on women nine months pregnant.225  
Uyghur women who would have six or seven children under normal circumstances, but 
are only allowed two or three according to the government’s policies, typically undergo 
ten abortions during their lifetime.226   
5. Cultural Genocide 
Many Uyghurs feel they are slowly losing their cultural identity because of 
Beijing’s policies toward their religion, language, interracial marriages, and other cultural 
traditions.  Islam is an important part of the Uyghur identity, yet Uyghurs are not able to 
practice their beliefs freely.  The use of the Uyghur language is also deteriorating, in 
schools as well as in literary publications.  Only 16 percent of all publications in Xinjiang 
are in the Uyghur language, and there are no modern encyclopedias or contemporary 
dictionaries published in Uyghur.227  Many Uyghur scholars fear they will be accused of 
promoting “nationalism” or “separatism” if they write on topics that do not directly 
support the CCP, such as Uyghur history and culture.228  Beijing’s encouragement of 
interracial marriages, by paying special bonuses to those who participate, further dilutes 
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Uyghur culture.  Children of these marriages are registered as only Chinese, and typically 
grow up learning little about their Uyghur heritage.  Finally, in recent months the 
government has increased its scrutiny of Uyghur cultural events. According to an official 
from the Communist Party office of Yili, a government circular on January 3, 2002 called 
on officials to step up surveillance of local religious and folk customs.229  The circular 
specifically targeted weddings, funerals, circumcision ceremonies, house-moving rituals, 
and the wearing of earrings in an effort to establish “spiritual civilization” and eradicate 
“feudal, superstitious, and backward ideas.”230 
6. Nuclear Testing 
Xinjiang is home to the world’s largest nuclear test site, the Lop Nor Nuclear 
Weapons Test Base, which extends over 100,000 sq km, with over 2,000 km of 
highways.231  Lop Nor is located only 265 kilometers southeast of Urumqi, the capital of 
Xinjiang.232  The PRC began construction of the site on April 1, 1960, and conducted its 
first test in 1964.  The site consists of three underground testing zones and one for 
atmospheric testing.  The latter became inactive after October 16, 1980, but the former 
remained in use until 1996.  Between 1964 and 1996, the PRC conducted 45 nuclear tests 
at Lop Nor.  Of these, the most detrimental to the local environment were the 23 
atmospheric tests, the largest of which occurred on 17 November 1976 and weighed four 
megatons.233  The total amount of plutonium-239 released between 1964 and 1995 is 
estimated at 3,300 curies, approximately 48 kilograms in weight.234  This material is 
extremely harmful.  It only takes one-millionth of a gram of plutonium-239 to cause 
cancer.235  Other harmful materials believed to have been released include cesium-137 
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and strontium-90, which have radioactive half-lives of 30 and 29 years.236  Although 
cesium-137 normally passes out of the body in two years, strontium-90 attaches to the 
bones and consequently stays in the body, transferring radiation doses over a longer 
period.237 
China ended its nuclear testing program on September 24, 1996, just prior to 
signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, however, it has done little to address the 
health concerns of the local population.  Beijing insists that its atmospheric testing did 
not cause any radioactive harm to neighboring countries or its own regions of Beijing, 
Lanzhou, or Dunhuang.238  Although the government denies it, the high levels of 
radioactive pollution has caused widespread cancer in the Lop Nor area and many 
Uyghur children are born with horrific birth defects.  The negative effects of nuclear 
testing also contribute to the alarmingly low life expectancy for the region. 
7. Episodes of Violence 
Given these circumstances and the lack of institutionalized methods to express 
anger and dissatisfaction in China’s political system, there some Uyghurs in Xinjiang 
have resorted to violence to redress their situation.  What is curious is what accounts for 
the dramatic increase in violence in the region that occurred over the past decade.  
Undoubtedly, the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent creation of the 
independent Muslim states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan inspired renewed 
efforts toward an independent Uyghur state.  However, another major contributing factor 
to the violence in Xinjiang is Beijing’s repressive policies themselves.  This is 
particularly evident in the spontaneous episodes of violence that erupted in protest of 
specific government policies or actions. 
In the past decade, two types of violence have plagued Xinjiang.  First have been 
the small-scale acts of violence claimed by or attributed to Uyghurs who belong to 
organizations that either want to establish an independent Islamic state or simply want to 
secede from the PRC.  Examples of this type of violence include the February 25, 1997 
bus bombing in Urumqi that coincided with Deng Xiaoping’s memorial service and killed 
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nine people, and the March 7, 1997 bus bombing in Beijing, which wounded thirty 
people and was attributed to but never proven to be the work of Uyghur separatists.239   
The second category of violence includes large-scale, spontaneous protests against either 
the local or central government that are typically held in protest of specific government 
policies or actions.  The three largest incidents of this type include the Baren uprising, the 
Hotan uprising, and the Yining (Gulja) uprising.   
The Baren uprising, named after the township near Kashgar where the uprising 
occurred, reportedly started as protests against the closing of mosques.  in a Xinjiang 
television report aired on April 21, the government attributed the disturbance to 
“extremely reactionary political forces whose aim was to undermine the motherland’s 
unification and unity among nationalities and practice splittism of nationalities,” rather 
than to religious tensions.240  Furthermore, the report stated that the evidence suggested 
the main threat to stability in Xinjiang came from “splittist forces within and outside the 
country.”241  The Hotan uprising, which occurred on July 7, 1995, was allegedly sparked 
by the arrest of a young imam and involved a major confrontation between Uyghurs and 
armed police.242  A group of Muslims arrived the local Mosque for prayer only to find 
the imam had reportedly been arrested.  Several hundred people went to the nearby 
government offices to ask for the imam’s release, but after this failed to produce results, 
they occupied the compound.  A violent confrontation ensued, culminating the arrival of 
20 lorries full of riot police, who closed the door of the compound, fired tear gas, and 
arrested the protesters.243  According to Amnesty International, several hundred people 
were arrested that day and many more during the following weeks.244   
The Yining uprising consisted of large-scale street demonstrations that occurred 
February 2-7, 1997 during the final week of Ramadan, resulting from months of severe 
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religious repression.  By February 6, a large number of riot squads and troops had arrived 
in the city, and soon after a curfew was imposed, the airport and railway station were 
closed, and the city was sealed for two weeks.245  During the suppression, many people 
were killed or injured.  Amnesty International reported over 50 people were sentenced at 
public rallies in Yining following this incident; 30 of them were sentenced at a rally held 
on April 24, 1997, including three Uyghurs who received death sentences.246   The 
remaining individuals received prison terms ranging from seven to 18 years, excluding 
one who received a life sentence for “hooliganism.”247  Although Beijing emphasizes the 
former type of violence in order to label the Uyghurs as terrorists and Islamic extremists 
and justify its repressive policies in Xinjiang, it is the latter type that more clearly 
communicates the sources of Uyghur unrest.           
C. BEJING’S VIEW OF XINJIANG 
1. The Value of Xinjiang   
Xinjiang is important to Beijing for numerous reasons.  First, it is strategically 
located as China’s most northwestern territory, with a border that stretches 5400 km and 
borders eight countries.  Historically, this region has served Beijing as a buffer against 
hostile forces.  Today, Xinjiang serves as a gateway to Central Asia and its many natural 
resources.  However, this also leads it open to influence from foreign countries, such as 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Second, Xinjiang is home to large quantities of 
natural resources, which Beijing badly needs to sustain its economic development.  The 
value of Xinjiang’s resources was not lost on early PRC leaders, as evidenced by Mao’s 
statement on April 25, 1956: 
The population of the minority nationalities in our country is small, but the 
area they inhabit is large.  The Han people comprise 94 per cent of the 
total population, an overwhelming majority…And who has more land?  
The minority nationalities, who occupy 60 per cent of the territory.  We 
say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in 
population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han nationality whose population 
is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose 
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resources are rich, or at least in all probability their resources under the 
soil are rich.248 
Mao’s assessment proved accurate, and the PRC has exploited Xinjiang’s 
seemingly unending supply of natural resources for decades.  In October 1999, the 
official Chinese news agency Xinhua announced that another large oilfield had been 
discovered in the northern part of the Tarim Basin, possibly holding as much as a billion 
tons of crude oil.249  Xinjiang also contains large reserves of coal, copper, and gold.250  
The PRC government’s systematic exploitation of Xinjiang’s natural resources, among 
other policies, led some China scholars to characterize its behavior as “internal 
colonialism.”251  Beijing continues to construct new factories with little regard for the 
effects on the local environment. 
Mao’s comment also referred to a third benefit gained by control over minority 
territory: living space for the Chinese people.  China’s population totals an astounding 
1.3 billion, and in spite of the government’s strict one-child policy, its population 
continues to grow.  Over the years, Beijing found other uses for the land as well, 
including a home for its massive lao gai prison system and nuclear test facilities.  
Understandably, neither of these developments made the indigenous people happy.   
Finally, if the Uyghurs achieved independence, it would have implications for 
other minorities who are unhappy with their status as part of the Chinese state.  
Therefore, it is important for Beijing to keep Xinjiang firmly under control.   Other large 
minority ethnic groups who clamor for freedom from China include the Tibetans and 
Inner Mongolians.  Furthermore, if Beijing is unable to hold onto Xinjiang, it ultimately 
has implications for Beijing’s claim on Taiwan.  A fragmenting of mainland China might 
give impetus to the independence movement of the Taiwanese.  For these reasons, China 
has been particularly sensitive to any threats to its territorial integrity in Xinjiang.    
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2. The Uyghur Threat   
There are a number of reasons why Beijing perceives the Uyghurs as a threat.  
First, the Uyghurs have a centuries long history of rebellion against the Chinese state.  
Throughout the rule of the Qing, the Republic of China, and finally, the PRC, the Chinese 
government regarded Xinjiang as a province prone to separatist revolts.  Second, in spite 
of all of Beijing’s efforts since 1949 to assimilate the Uyghurs and other Muslim 
minorities into a multinational unitary Chinese state, Uyghurs continue to espouse their 
desire for independence.  The 1990s witnessed renewed efforts toward independence, 
including some instances of violence.   
Third, these episodes of social instability play upon the government’s traditional 
fears of “popular unrest within and foreign aggression without,” which further exacerbate 
Beijing’s security concerns in Xinjiang.  All Chinese dynasties fell victim to one or both 
of these threats, primarily because as the power of the dynasties waned, they were more 
susceptible to uprisings and foreign attacks.  These events frequently occurred 
simultaneously, and over time, heralded the coming end of the dynasty.  Beijing’s 
concern that an outside country could use the Uyghurs as an instrument to topple the CCP 
is evident in the leadership’s tendency to blame Uyghur unrest on the influence of 
“international counterrevolutionary forces.”252 
Fourth, Beijing’s perception of the Uyghur threat is influenced by the legacy of 
foreign religions, particularly ones Western in origin, as ideological basis for rebellion 
against the state, which continues to haunt Beijing.  The influence of Western religious 
beliefs spawned some of the greatest uprisings in Chinese history, such as the Taiping 
Rebellion.  The long-standing and deep-seated suspicion of religion and foreign influence 
is manifested in the 1982 PRC constitution, which states that religion may not be used to 
“destroy the social order, damage the health of citizens or obstruct the activities of the 
state educational system,” and that “religious organizations and religious work must not 
be controlled by foreign forces.”253  Beijing believes that the Uyghurs embody all three 
traditional threats: domestic unrest, affiliation with foreign states, and a persuasive 
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religion that eludes Beijing’s control.  Furthermore, the Uyghurs’ history of rebellion 
against the Chinese state, their stated goals of independence and their recent uses of 
violence toward that end, their Islamic beliefs, and their affiliations with other Islamic 
peoples seem to confirm Beijing’s suspicions.   
To the extent that Uyghur separatists employ violent means, the PRC government 
has a legitimate concern that it should protect against.  However, the majority of Uyghurs 
who advocate independence do not resort to violence.  Yet Beijing’s policies fail to 
discriminate between those individuals who bomb a bus and those individuals who 
comment that they would rather not be part of China.  Furthermore, many Uyghurs are 
pragmatic and realize they will not likely achieve independence in the near future, or 
possibly ever.  They are, however, increasingly dissatisfied with their lack of political 
autonomy, low standards of living, inability to practice their religious beliefs, and denial 
of cultural rights.  They desire better housing conditions, health care, and more work 
opportunities, which Beijing has yet to deliver.  Although Beijing has pumped 
considerable capital into the area to foster economic reform, Han Chinese rather than 
Uyghurs or other minorities realize most of the benefits from these policies.  In addition, 
Beijing’s policy of sponsoring a massive migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang and the 
disparity between the standard of living and opportunities provided to the Uyghurs and 
other minorities compared with those afforded to the Han further exacerbate the tensions 
in the region.  In these respects, the sources of Uyghur unrest are found within Beijing’s 
policies themselves rather than in Islamic beliefs or foreign influence. 
Not only has Beijing misjudged the sources of Uyghur unrest, it has also 
misjudged the extent to which the Uyghurs are a threat.254  There have been fewer than 
five security-related incidents in Xinjiang since 1998.  Although the Uyghurs have had 
some success in conducting small demonstrations, the Uyghur independence movement 
is severely limited by a number of factors.  Domestically, the immense amount of PLA 
regulars, People’s Armed Police, and other state security forces located in Xinjiang are 
better trained, better armed, and vastly outnumber Uyghur secessionists.  Internationally, 
the Uyghurs are not nearly as well known, organized, or connected as the Tibetans.  
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Whereas the Tibetan Dalai Lama provides clear leadership for the Tibetan movement, the 
Uyghurs have no equivalent spokesperson.  Shortages of funding and low levels of 
education further limit the Uyghur independence movement.  In this light, the 
government’s assessment of the threat in Xinjiang is likely overstated.  Beijing’s policies, 
largely determined by the perceived security threat in the region, are increasingly harsh 
and result in increased human rights violations and resentment toward the central 
government.   
D. BEIJING’S SOLUTION TO THE UYGHUR QUESTION 
In order to counter the perceived Uyghur threat, Beijing has designed a number of 
policies.  Domestically, Beijing’s policies aim to integrate the predominantly Muslim 
Uyghur population into a multinational, unitary state.  Internationally, Beijing wants to 
isolate the Uyghur secession movement from international support.   
1. Domestic Policy 
Since the Qing dynasty first conquered Xinjiang, successive Chinese governments 
have encouraged the migration of Han Chinese into the region as one method of 
incorporating the new territory into the Chinese state.  However, the PRC was the first to 
initiate mass migration policies, which have been quite successful over the last four 
decades.  Whereas in 1949 the Uyghurs constituted approximately 90 percent of the total 
population in Xinjiang, by 1997 that number had dropped to 47 percent percent.  In 
contrast, the percentage of Han Chinese in Xinjiang rose from about 6 percent to 38 
percent during the same period.  Recent efforts include Jiang Zemin’s “go west” 
program, which aims to attract Han Chinese from the Three Gorges Dam area to 
Xinjiang.  The second major strategy the PRC government employed was to implement 
economic reforms designed to help integrate the local populations into the Chinese state.  
The government spent large amounts of money during the past two decades toward this 
end.  Since 1981, each five-year plan has allocated more funds for development in 
Xinjiang, growing from 8.2 billion RMB to 17.9 billion RMB in 1986 to 34.5 billion 
RMB in 1991.255  In June 1999, Beijing launched the “great western development” 
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program, which allocated an additional 420 billion RMB to Xinjiang.256  Beijing’s 
development plan includes building up the region’s infrastructure and communication 
capabilities and constructing a natural gas pipeline from Xinjiang to Shanghai.257  In 
spite of these efforts, little seems to have changed for the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.  Many 
continue to live in abysmally low standards of living and tensions between the Uyghurs 
and Han are only increasing.   
Following the increased instances of violence in the early 1990s, on March 19, 
1996, Jiang Zemin hosted a meeting of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee in 
Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang.258  Its purpose was to discuss the Uyghur question.  The 
proceedings, laid out in a top secret party document known as CCP Document No-7, 
reveal the extremes to which Beijing feels threatened by the Uyghurs and details the 
lengths to which Beijing is prepared to go to protect its hold over Xinjiang.  The 
document stated, “national separatism and illegal religious activity are the main threats to 
stability in Xinjiang,” and “the main problem is that international counterrevolutionary 
forced led by the United States of America are openly supporting the separatists activities 
inside and outside of Xinjiang.”259  In the document, CCP leaders acknowledged that 
“maintaining the stability of Xinjiang is a long term, complicated, and difficult task.”260   
After laying out the problems in Xinjiang, the document outlined Beijing’s 
solution.  First, Beijing called on every party and government organization to “strengthen 
the construction of all levels of government, especially on the basic level of government, 
and create a team of cadres who are politically dependable.”261  Next, Beijing directed 
officials to “implement comprehensively and correctly the ethnic and religious policy of 
the party and strengthen the legal control of ethnic and religious affairs.”262  Third, the 
party should employ strong propaganda and investigate and organize schools in order to 
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“stabilize the ideological and cultural stronghold against separatism.”263  In addition, the 
government should strengthen security organizations in the region, such as Public Safety 
and National Security, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and the People’s 
Liberation Army.264  Next, the party should employ diplomacy to urge countries such as 
Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan to “limit and weaken the activities of separatists 
forces inside their borders.”265  Finally, the party should continue the economic 
development of the region.266  Overall, the strategy outlined in CCP Document No-7 
severely restricted the rights of the Uyghurs and other minorities living in Xinjiang and 
imposed harsh policies to counter any resistance.  As a result, almost all human rights 
violations in Xinjiang are linked to Beijing’s efforts to curb Uyghur separatist activity.   
Shortly after this meeting was held, in April 1996, Beijing launched the first 
“strike hard” campaign.  In larger China, this campaign was designed to target “major 
common criminals,” but in Xinjiang and other minority regions, authorities focused on 
“national splittests, violent terrorists, and religious extremists.”267  The campaign resulted 
in increased arbitrary arrests, public sentencing rallies, and executions numbering in the 
thousands.  On April 3, 2001, Jiang Zemin initiated a second “strike hard” campaign, 
making it clear that the Chinese government was determined to preserve social 
stability.268  Again, this campaign resulted in more arrests, detentions, and executions.  
Between April – June 2001, local authorities arrested 605 suspects and held over 100 
mass sentencing rallies.  Following the September 11 attacks, the Chinese government 
further intensified its crackdown in the XUAR.  The authorities imposed new restrictions 
on religious freedom, closed down mosques, and subjected Islamic clergy to intensive 
scrutiny and “political education.”269  Amnesty International estimated that between 
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October 2001 and March 2002 thousands of people were detained for investigations on 
political grounds and many were charged under the new Criminal Law adopted on 
December 29, 2001 by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.270  
The purpose of the new law was to “punish terrorist crimes, ensure national security and 
the safety of people’s lives and property, and uphold social order.”271  However, due to 
the vague wording of the amendments, the new law could be applied to peaceful political 
opposition or religious groups.272      
2. International Policy 
In keeping with the strategy outlined in CCP Document #7, since 1996 the 
Chinese government has used its foreign policy to isolate the Uyghur separatists from 
international support.  Beijing maintains close relations with its neighboring countries in 
order secure their support against Uyghur secessionists.  In 1996, the PRC, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan established the Shanghai Five, an association 
committed to quelling the threat of Islamic militants.  On April 18, 2001, the Shanghai 
Five signed the Bishkek Protocol, which called for the establishment of an anti-terrorism 
center in Bishkek, where Russian, Chinese, and Central Asian officers will likely 
organize anti-militant operations in the region.273   Beijing achieved some success 
through this organization.  Kazakhstan has severely limited the activities of its Uyghurs, 
prompting one Uyghur spokesperson to remark, “Uyghurs can hardly breathe in 
Kazakhstan.”274  On June 14, 2001, the Shanghai Five incorporated Uzbekistan, and on 
15 June 2001, adopted the new name Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).   The 
declaration establishing the SCO states the organization’s purpose is “to strengthen 
mutual trust, friendship and good-neighborliness between the member States; to 
encourage effective cooperation between them in the political, trade and economic, 
scientific and technical, cultural, educational, energy, transport, environmental and other 
spheres; and to undertake joint efforts for the maintenance of peace, security and stability 
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in the region, and the building of a new, democratic, just and rational international 
political and economic order.”275  Undoubtedly, Beijing will continue to use this forum 
as a source of support for its crackdown in Xinjiang. 
The September 11 terrorist attack on the United States prompted Beijing to call 
for support from the larger international community as well.  On September 18, 2001, the 
Chinese government publicly equated Uyghur separatists with global terrorism and called 
for support from other nations for its efforts to combat “terrorism” in Xinjiang.  To date, 
this strategy has not been as successful as Beijing hoped.  Initially, Western diplomats 
disputed China’s claims that Uyghurs are linked with Osama bin Laden’s international 
terrorist organization.276  Many human rights organizations feared that Beijing was using 
the international movement on combating terrorism to justify its human rights violations 
in Xinjiang.  In October 2001, during a meeting with Jiang Zemin in Shanghai, United 
States President George W. Bush warned China against persecuting minorities in the 
name of the war on terrorism.277  After a meeting on December 6, 2001 with Chinese 
Vice Foreign Ministers Li Zhaoxing and Wang Yi, United States Ambassador at Large 
for Terrorism Francis X. Taylor contended that “the legitimate economic and social 
issues that confront the people in Western China are not necessarily terrorist issues and 
should be resolved politically rather than using counter terrorism methods.”278   
For over a year, Washington refused to acknowledge the Uyghurs as terrorists.  
However, it became increasingly difficult to deny some Uyghur extremists’ links to 
Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist network, particularly after U.S. forces encountered Uyghurs 
fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Even so, the challenge remained for 
Washington to acknowledge this connection without giving Beijing blanket approval for 
its harsh and often inappropriate policies in the region.  After much debate, the Bush 
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administration announced on August 26, 2002 that it had added the East Turkistan 
Islamic Movement (ETIM) to its list of designated foreign terrorist organizations.  In a 
press conference in Beijing, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage explained, “after 
careful study we [the U.S. government] judged that it was a terrorist group, that it 
committed acts of violence against unarmed civilians without any regard for who was 
hurt.”279  However, Secretary Armitage stressed to Chinese leaders that the PRC “still 
has an obligation to respect the human rights of its minorities, including the Uyghurs.”280   
There was some speculation that Washington’s decision to designate ETIM as a 
terrorist organization was made in exchange for Beijing’s cooperation on the issue of 
weapons proliferation.  On August 25 Beijing released the text of new missile and 
technology export regulations, which require Chinese firms to register with the 
government prior to exporting missiles and related technology.281  However, on October 
24, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft reiterated that Washington’s decision was not 
based on  “political negotiations or a sense of timing,” but on “evidence that supports the 
designation.”282  Beijing’s regulations on proliferation were more likely the result of 
sanctions imposed by the Bush administration earlier in the year.  On July 24 the U.S. 
Department of State announced sanctions against eight Chinese companies and one 
individual for alleged sales to Iran and Iraq weapons or chemical and biological materials 
that could be used in weapons of mass destruction.283   
Although Beijing was pleased with Washington’s decision to include ETIM on its 
list of international terrorist organizations, the situation in XUAR remains a point of 
contention.  Washington remains concerned with the high number of human rights 
violations that reportedly occur in the region.  On its part, Beijing remains upset by 
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Washington’s refusal to accommodate Beijing’s request that several Uyghurs who were 
captured in Afghanistan fighting alongside the Taliban be returned to China so that they 
could be dealt with “according to the law.”284  Initially, U.S. officials stated that the 
detained Uyghurs would not be repatriated because Washington did not regard them as 
members of a terrorist organization.285  Beijing cites Washington’s continued refusal in 
spite of their recent designation as terrorists as another example of the United States’ 
double standard concerning human rights.   
E. CONSEQUENCES OF BEIJING’S POLICIES  
The Chinese government designed its policies toward the XUAR to protect the 
territorial integrity of the PRC against the perceived threat of Uyghur separatism.  
However, Beijing has exaggerated the threat of the Uyghur movement and misjudged the 
causes for Uyghur separatism.  The Uyghurs lack a unifying leadership, effective 
organization, adequate funding, and sufficient training and munitions compared to the 
PLA and other Chinese security forces in Xinjiang.  Therefore, the Uyghur secession 
movement does not pose a credible threat to the Chinese government or justify its harsh 
policies in the region.  Beijing asserts that its problems in the XUAR are largely due to 
Islamic fundamentalism and foreign influences.  In reality, Islamic fundamentalism is 
rare among Uyghur Muslims, and the real reasons for Uyghur anger and violence are 
Beijing’s repressive policies themselves.  On September 1, 2001, Wang Lequan, the 
Secretary of the XUAR Communist Party Committee, and Abdulahat Abdurixit, the 
Chairman of the XUAR Regional government, told a group of Chinese and foreign 
reporters visiting Urumqi that “Xinjiang is not a place of terror” and “by no means is 
Xinjiang a place where violence and terrorist accidents take place often.”286  These 
statements cast doubt on the credibility of Beijing’s claims made since September 11 
concerning the Uyghur threat and the prevalence of terrorism in the region and its need to 
employ such harsh policies.   
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Beijing’s primary goals regarding the XUAR were to integrate the Uyghurs into a 
multinational, unitary state and isolate the Uyghur secession movement from 
international support.  Domestically, Beijing’s policies are largely having the opposite 
effects.  Beijing’s denial of religious and cultural rights has fueled Uyghur anger toward 
the Chinese government, and Beijing’s migration policies and failure to provide equal 
opportunities for Uyghurs and Han Chinese has exacerbated tensions in the region and 
caused a backlash against the local and central governments.  As a result, in the last 
decade there have been increased instances of violence in Xinjiang and a dramatic 
increase in the number of human rights violations throughout the region.  Internationally, 
Beijing has seen some success in limiting the Uyghurs’ ability to operate in neighboring 
states, such as Kazakhstan, and has obtained limited support from the United States.  
However, the prevalence of human rights violations in Xinjiang has attracted much 
criticism from the international human rights regime.  Beijing is keenly aware of the 
increased international attention given to its policies in the XUAR, and Chinese scholars 
have even contended that a nationalist separatist movement could result in a humanitarian 
intervention led by the United States, similar to what occurred in Kosovo in 1999.287  
Although this is unlikely, continued Chinese repression of the Uyghurs and other 
minorities in Xinjiang will likely remain a point of contention in Sino-American relations 
and could impede its relations with many of its Muslim neighbors as well.      
If Beijing truly wants the situation in Xinjiang to improve, it needs to reevaluate 
the credibility of the Uyghur threat and the reasons for Uyghur unrest, and adjust its 
policies accordingly.  Until Beijing is willing to address Uyghurs complaints concerning 
political persecution, religious repression, discrimination, coercive birth control, cultural 
genocide, and nuclear testing, the situation in the XUAR will only continue to deteriorate, 
and human rights violations will remain prevalent.  The Bush administration was correct 
to designate ETIM as a terrorist organization, as there have been legitimate acts of 
violence in the XUAR.  However, Washington should continue to stress that the war on 
terrorism should not be used to legitimize repression and other human rights violations, 
and that it does not condone Beijing’s indiscriminate crackdown on the Uyghurs in the 
XUAR.  Washington should pressure Beijing to uphold minority and religious rights in 
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Xinjiang and to allow unrestricted visits to the region by UN and independent human 
rights monitors.  Washington should encourage Beijing to acknowledge that Islamic 
fundamentalism is not the primary reason for violence in the XUAR and initiate a 
dialogue with Uyghurs that would address their complaints.  Washington should provide 
funding for NGOs that preserve the Uyghurs cultural heritage and provide educational 
opportunities for Uyghurs.  Washington should also provide funding for NGOs that can 
provide medical assistance in Xinjiang, particularly in regard to combating the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic.  Finally, Washington should encourage U.S. businesses operating 
in the XUAR to initiate affirmative action programs that would provide additional 
employment opportunities to Uyghurs in an effort to reduce the economic disparity 








































V. CONSTRUCTING A SUCCESSFUL HUMAN RIGHTS 
POLICY  
From the late 1940s until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War largely 
determined the shape of the international system, and with it the focus of American 
foreign policy.  The United States’ struggle to preserve the American way of life and 
contain the threat of Soviet expansion dominated American foreign policy priorities.  On 
February 27, 1972 the United States and the PRC signed the Shanghai communiqué, 
establishing the basis for Sino-American strategic cooperation, and the PRC became an 
integral component of the United States’ containment policy in Asia.  Consequently, the 
U.S. government, like the majority of the international community, largely ignored the 
human rights conditions in the PRC, and human rights did not occupy a prominent role in 
its China policy.  However, following Beijing’s brutal suppression of peaceful democracy 
advocates on June 4, 1989, many in the United States called for a policy review, asserting 
that Washington should take a harder stance against human rights abuses in China.  The 
Tiananmen Square massacre, combined with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
marked a major turning point in Sino-American relations.   
Without the strategic rationale for Sino-American cooperation, which had 
governed the relationship for nearly two decades, American policy toward China became 
hostage to the lack of consensus in Washington and the increasing influence of interest 
groups in the policy making process.  As a result, a number of conflicting issues largely 
ignored during the era of Sino-American strategic cooperation emerged to complicate 
U.S.-China relations, including the issue of human rights.  The dilemma the issue of 
human rights created between protecting national interests and upholding American 
values further complicated the task of constructing a successful China policy.  
Policymakers attempted to reconcile national interests, such as access to Chinese 
markets, protecting American intellectual property rights, reducing arms proliferation, 
and maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula, with equally important value-related 
issues, such as human rights and supporting Taiwan against PRC aggression.  
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In spite of these challenges, former President Bush recognized the importance of 
maintaining a constructive relationship with the PRC, and the Bush administration’s 
engagement policy toward the PRC enabled the continuation of cooperation between 
American and Chinese leaders without sacrificing American interests.  Although 
criticized by human rights activists in general for not reacting strongly enough to the 
Tiananmen incident and, in particular, for undermining the cause of human rights by 
secretly sending Scowcroft and Eagleburger to consult with Chinese leaders, Bush’s 
policies ultimately resulted in a number of concessions from Beijing on human rights and 
other issues.  However, under the former Clinton administration, in the absence of a clear 
and defining vision for Sino-American relations, China policy floundered and the U.S.-
China relationship drifted without purpose.  Initially, Clinton adopted a tough posture on 
human rights.  However, by failing to enunciate a clear direction for the relationship and 
capitulating to pressure from the American business community, the Clinton 
administration’s policies only exacerbated tensions with the PRC and reinforced the 
Chinese perception that human rights are not really an important goal in American 
foreign policy.  As a result, Clinton made little progress toward real improvements in the 
human rights conditions in China. 
During the first nine months of his presidency, President George W. Bush seemed 
to be taking the same ill-defined, crisis-driven approach to managing Sino-American 
relations as his predecessor.  Similar to the Clinton administration, the Bush 
administration did not enunciate a post-Cold war vision for conducting relations with the 
PRC.  Meanwhile, the EP-3E crisis, combined with what Beijing regarded as President 
Bush’s often inflammatory rhetoric on Taiwan and other security issues, inhibited 
bilateral relations.  However, in the wake of September 11, Washington decided that it 
could ill-afford an antagonistic relationship with Beijing.  The United States faced the 
daunting task of simultaneously battling an al-Qaeda threat that spanned over 60 
countries, sustaining a loosely knit government in Afghanistan, disarming Iraq, and 
reinvigorating the U.S. economy.288  On its part, Beijing had its own reasons for 
welcoming improved relations with the United States.  Confronted with rising crime and 
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unemployment, failing state-owned enterprises, a widening gap between rich and poor, 
rampant corruption, WTO obligations, and the challenges presented by a transitioning 
leadership, Beijing needs a stable international environment that allows it to focus on 
domestic concerns.  
The ongoing international war on terrorism provided Washington and Beijing 
with a new strategic rationale for Sino-American cooperation, and the Bush 
administration appears to have finally formulated a clear vision to guide Sino-American 
relations in the twenty-first century.  On December 5, 2002, in an address to the National 
Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Ambassador Richard N. Haass, the director of the 
U.S. Department of State policy planning staff, stated:  
China is not imperial Germany.  No "law" of history now pulls us 
inexorably toward dangerous and expensive competition, much less 
conflict.  Cooperation is equally - I would argue, more - likely.  But what 
will be central, what in large part will shape the future of our relations, 
will be how China's new leaders choose to use their country's growing 
power….The international community will be far better off if China is 
integrated into this system of shared interests and values, rather than 
languishing -- or, worse yet, contesting it from the outside.  U.S. policy is 
guided by the principle that we can be more successful in confronting 
pressing security, economic, and human challenges by working with 
partners rather than working alone -- and by a belief that China has the 
potential to become one of our most important partners….If China is to be 
fully integrated into an international system of norms, rules, and common 
interests, it will need to use its emerging power to support the common 
objectives for which these regimes stand: nonproliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction; lower tariff and investment barriers; the rule of law; and 
the promotion of human rights.289 
Haass’ statement outlines the administration’s new direction for China policy, which 
focuses on the integration of China into the international system.  The administration may 
use this approach to successfully engage the PRC on a number of issues, including 
human rights.  By approaching the subject of human rights not as a matter of forcing 
China to comply with U.S. standards or adopt American values, but as a matter of 
China’s obligation to comply with international norms and standards, Washington could 
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avoid one of the main points of disagreement with Beijing, which is how to define human 
rights.   
The primary goal of Washington’s human rights policy should be to reduce the 
number of human rights violations in China.  Although Chinese leaders have worked to 
improve the perceptions of human rights in China, the PRC government remains 
authoritarian in nature and continues to withhold certain civil and political freedoms.  As 
such, Washington should first focus on improving Beijing’s human rights policies.  As 
the basic premise of its human rights dialogue with the PRC, the United States should 
emphasize that China, as a responsible member of the international community, must 
adhere to international norms and standards related to human rights.  The United States 
should remind Chinese leaders of their obligations to provide the freedoms guaranteed in 
the PRC constitution and the ICESCR and the ICCPR.  Washington should press China 
to ratify the ICCPR.  Toward this end, the United States should also sign and ratify both 
the ICESCR and ICCPR.  Washington should emphasize that it is not interested in 
imposing the U.S. political system or American values on China; however, certain human 
rights are universal and should be respected by all governments.  The United States 
should stress to Chinese leaders that in order to be recognized as a great power, China 
needs to behave in a responsible manner commensurate with that status.  The United 
States should make human rights improvements, such as the release of political prisoners 
and access to Chinese prisons, Tibet, and Xinjiang by international human rights 
monitors, a pre-condition for Sino-American summits.   
As a second focus of its human rights policy, the United States should work to 
better establish the rule of law in China.  Following Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 
1978, Beijing initiated numerous legal reforms, primarily in an effort to attract foreign 
investment.  During the Cultural Revolution, “bourgeois rights” were a key target of 
radical Maoist rhetoric that urged people to “smash the Public Security Bureau, the 
Prosecutors, and the Courts.”290  As a consequence, in the late 1970s respect for 
individual rights was at an all time low and China’s legal system was in shambles.  Initial 
reforms included the passage in 1979 of laws that formalized the institutions of the 
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people’s courts, the people’s procuratorate, local people’s congresses, and local people’s 
governments.291  In an effort to expand and professionalize China’s lawyers and judges, 
and increase the peoples’ awareness about their rights, legal studies departments and 
related programs were reinstalled in China’s universities.  Other legislation established 
China’s first formal Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law; however, it limited the 
role of the trial court to confirmation of the procuratorate’s pre-trial determination of 
guilt rather than establishing a forum for determining fact and administering justice.292   
Since these early reforms Beijing has made a concerted effort to improve its legal 
system and modify its criminal code.  The government has passed hundreds of laws and 
attempted to revamp its court system.  However, the country’s legal system continues to 
be plagued by serious problems that contribute to its numerous human rights violations.  
These problems include the lack of due process, pervasive summary trials and executions, 
and the admission as evidence of confessions obtained via torture.  Beijing’s efforts to 
promote the rule of law have not entirely remedied the country’s legal problems or 
eliminated its human rights violations.  Even so, these efforts have strengthened certain 
institutions that are necessary to protect individual rights and ultimately improve the 
human rights conditions in China.  Furthermore, Beijing has demonstrated a willingness 
to entertain suggestions and receive outside assistance in improving China’s legal system.  
As such, supporting China’s legal development is an excellent opportunity for the United 
States to increase cooperation with Beijing and foster better human rights policies.  The 
United States should focus its efforts on areas such as the development of democratic 
institutions, reforming legal procedures and processes, improving the transparency of the 
legal system, treating individuals equally before the law, and establishing an independent 
judiciary.293 
As it works to achieve these goals, Washington must maintain a firm and 
consistent stance toward the issue of human rights.  If the Bush administration wants 
Chinese leaders to respond constructively to its human rights initiatives, human rights 
cannot be viewed as a means to an end.  To date, Washington has found a balance 
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between its need to secure Beijing’s support for the war on terrorism and its efforts to 
promote human rights in the PRC.  By acknowledging that some Uyghur extremists are 
associated with terrorist organizations, Washington merely admitted what most of the 
world already knew.  However, by simultaneously admonishing Beijing that it should not 
use the war on terrorism as an excuse for an indiscriminate crackdown on the largely 
innocent Uyghur population in Xinjiang, Washington demonstrated its commitment to 
human rights.  In future relations with Beijing, Washington must remain resolute in its 
efforts to promote human rights in the PRC.   
Until Beijing is willing to subordinate itself to the rule of law and adopt a more 
liberal and pluralistic political system, which upholds civil and political liberties in 
practice as well as rhetoric, there will continue to be limitations to the rights guaranteed 
in the China.  However, as demonstrated by the 1989 Tiananmen protests, internal 
pressures are at work within the PRC that may soon force the communist regime to 
implement limited political reforms that could pave the way for real improvement in the 
country’s human rights conditions.  The reforms of the Deng era have generated certain 
social tensions in China that the CCP leadership cannot afford to ignore.  It is becoming 
increasingly difficult for Beijing to provide adequate food, housing, employment, social 
security, and medical care for all of its 1.3 billion citizens.  This gives rise to discontent 
among those most effected, namely the country’s 800 million peasants.  The government 
estimates as many as 100 million peasants have “illegally” migrated into the cities in 
search of employment, which has exacerbated regional tensions and lowered real wages 
in the cites.294  The workers of the failing state-owned enterprises, who along with the 
peasants are the party’s traditional base of support, are also becoming increasingly 
dissatisfied with the regime.  Demonstrations by laid-off and unpaid workers are 
becoming more prevalent, and some workers have attempted to organize unions outside 
that of the state controlled ACFTU.   
Over the past decade third generation CCP leaders, led by President Jiang Zemin, 
successfully managed these tensions, through continued economic growth, raised living 
standards, cooptation of challenging sections of society, or when necessary, suppression.  
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Beijing’s policies have effectively preserved the regime to date, but many challenges 
remain.  Corruption is rampant among party officials.  China’s growing middle class is 
taking on the role of a fledgling civil society, which is typically a precursor to demanding 
more popular participation in politics.  Meanwhile, the party’s ability to directly control 
Chinese society has vastly diminished, and it is by no means a foregone conclusion that 
the increasingly professional PLA will support another crackdown on the Chinese people 
as it did in 1989.  Additionally, outside influences, such as China’s recent WTO 
membership, put additional pressures on the regime.   
In many ways, the 1989 democracy movement proved that Chinese society cannot 
forever remain shackled by a repressive and undemocratic political system.  CCP leaders 
recognize that if the party is to survive, it must continue to evolve to keep pace with the 
ongoing changes in Chinese society.  Therefore, the CCP leadership recently appointed 
during the 16th Communist Party Congress will likely continue to introduce incremental 
political and economic reforms, which could eventually lead to real improvements in 
Beijing’s human rights policies.  Pressure applied by the United States, in the form of a 
firm and consistent policy that emphasizes Beijing’s obligation to uphold international 
human rights standards as well as the importance of human rights and the rule of law, 
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